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What has China gained from its foreign aid and investment activity? Does the 
instrument China chooses reveal its political motive? Does Chinese economic statecraft 
present a challenge to U.S. national interest? To answer these questions, this thesis 
examines the history of Communist China’s foreign policy in Cambodia and in Kenya 
since 1956 and 1964, respectively. China has delivered aid to, made investments in, and 
traded with both states, but the interests China has pursued, and the vigor with which it 
has pursued them, are different in each. In Cambodia, China has a rich and continuing 
record of intrusive political influence and military engagement. In Kenya, China’s 
purchase of political influence under Mao has cooled considerably to become today’s 
arm’s-length trade and development relationship. This thesis concludes that Chinese 
economic statecraft buys political influence in Cambodia but not in Kenya, where aid is 
developmental and investment is driven by business opportunity. From both realist and 
liberal perspectives, China’s economic statecraft presents a challenge to the interests of 
the United States. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND FINDINGS 
China commits foreign aid and investments to recipient states all over the globe, 
but the recipients of that aid and the types of financing China extends to them are diverse. 
Among those recipients are Cambodia and Kenya, which are developmentally similar but 
different in terms of their cultures, politics, and geographical proximity to China. This 
thesis asks, with Cambodia and Kenya as case studies, what has China achieved, and 
what does it hope to achieve, by giving foreign aid? Does China’s choice of financing 
indicate the interests it wants to pursue? Does China’s pursuit of national interests with 
foreign aid present a challenge to U.S. national interests? 
This thesis finds that China’s economic engagement in Cambodia and Kenya 
indicate two distinct economic statecraft strategies. China has delivered aid to, made 
investments in, and traded with both states, but the interests China has pursued, and the 
vigor with which it has pursued them, are different in each. In Cambodia, China has a 
rich and continuing record of intrusive political influence and military engagement. In 
Kenya, China’s purchase of political influence under Mao has cooled considerably to 
become today’s arms-length trade and development relationship. This thesis concludes 
that Chinese economic statecraft buys political influence in Cambodia but not in Kenya, 
where aid is developmental and investment is driven by business opportunity. From both 
realist and liberal perspectives, China’s economic statecraft presents a challenge to the 
interests of the United States. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
China has a long history of economic statecraft. Nearly every year since the 
inception of the People’s Republic, China has contributed aid to a long list of 
geographically, politically, and economically diverse states.1 Since 1978, China’s 
economic reforms and opening policy have yielded dramatic economic growth, and 
                                                 
1 John F. Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. II: History and Practice in 
Asia, 1950–Present (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 142. 
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growing along with the economy are increasingly generous pledges of aid. Particularly 
since the turn of the twenty-first century, China has devoted a great deal of effort into 
offering loans, grants, military exchanges, and preferential trade arrangements with 93 
recipient states across the globe.2 
The Sino-Cambodian relationship (and the aid that may support it) appears to be 
particularly strong, despite distinct political systems, noncontiguous borders, and absence 
of common ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Despite their differences, China and 
Cambodia may share common concerns about security and development in Southeast 
Asia, the course of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) policy, and other 
regional interests. China’s relationship with Kenya, on the other hand, appears to stretch 
across a much greater geographical, cultural, and political distance. Kenya and Cambodia 
are similar countries in many respects, but China may have very different goals in each. 
The similarity of Kenya and Cambodia, the dissimilarity of their relationship with China, 
and the common element of Chinese aid that flows to each make them good cases to 
begin answering the fundamental research question: What does China get from its foreign 
aid program?  
Whether aid is altruistic, self-serving, mutually beneficial, or motivated by private 
interests, foreign aid must have a purpose. China’s purposes are not always clear, leading 
Western policy makers to watch China’s twenty-first-century rise with various levels of 
admiration and alarm. The growth of China’s economy, the growth and diversification of 
its foreign aid efforts, and the opacity of China’s intentions and effects all magnify 
China’s potential as a geopolitical rival to the United States and warrant further study: 
Does China’s aid present a problem for U.S. interests? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The existing literature contains a substantial amount of research on Chinese 
foreign aid. This body of work can very generally be analyzed through two lenses: first, 
foreign aid’s beneficial or deleterious effects on recipient states’ public health, 
                                                 
2 Charles Wolf, Jr., Xiao Wang, and Eric Warner, China’s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored 
Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations, and Implications (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 
report, 2013), 59, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR118.html.  
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governance, and infrastructure; and second, foreign aid’s use in the pursuit of Chinese 
national interests and the degree of concern the United States should have about it.  
1. Aid Outcomes 
Considerable debate exists about whether aid from China helps a recipient state or 
hurts it. This debate focuses on the experience of the recipient state and generally hinges 
on the effects of aid conditionality. The instruments that China uses in its foreign aid 
programs, the terms used to describe them, and their effects are subtly different from 
those of the West. This section outlines the structure of Western and Chinese aid, the 
conditions imposed in each approach, and the existing literature evaluating their 
effectiveness. 
Western aid uses the clearly defined methods of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), an arm of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), which differ from China’s accounting methods in important ways. 
Western aid, including that from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, and individual donor nations such as the United States, generally conforms to the 
OECD-DAC model of conditional assistance: Foreign aid is a narrowly defined, formal 
mechanism for the purpose of economic development and stable governance in the 
recipient state.3 Official developmental assistance (ODA) is one standard that OECD-
DAC members apply to foreign aid. In order for foreign aid to qualify as ODA, foreign 
aid must meet a number of requirements: 
Official development assistance is defined as those flows to countries and 
territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients… and to multilateral 
development institutions which are: 
i.  provided by official agencies, including state and local 
governments, or by their executive agencies; and 
ii.  each transaction of which: 
a)  is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and 
                                                 
3 “Is It ODA?,” Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, November 2008, 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf.  
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b)  is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at 
least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per 
cent).4  
Foreign aid from OECD members frequently does not meet those concessional 
requirements, in which case aid is considered “other official flows” (OOF). Examples 
include military aid that does not contribute to the recipient’s economic development, 
market-rate loans that do not carry concessional grant elements, and export credits 
extended to the patron’s firms rather than eligible recipient state agencies.5 Both ODA 
and OOF are important foreign aid mechanisms, but they are accounted for separately. 
ODA and OOF transactions alike are published by the OECD for its member countries. 
Western aid, and U.S. aid in particular, generally comes with additional 
conditions: Recipient states must satisfy certain standards of transparency and 
governance and must maintain sustainable budget deficits in order to qualify for aid. 
These standards are a central tenet of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), one 
of the United States’ foreign aid arms. The MCC requires its recipient states to commit to 
“good governance, economic freedom, and investments in their citizens.”6 Western aid 
imposes a prescriptive model of “correct” governance (which Chinese aid does not). 
Widely accepted by the Western aid community, the work of Craig Burnside and David 
Dollar is influential to this approach. They suggest developmental aid is most effective 
when given to countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies. Aid recipient 
states with poor governance and economic institutions are likely to gain little from aid.7 
Western aid, with ODA’s restrictions and liberal conditionality, is generally transparent 
and formalized.8 
                                                 
4 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
5 “Other Official Flows (OOF),” OECD, 2016, https://data.oecd.org/drf/other-official-flows-oof.htm.  
6 “About MCC,” Millennium Challenge Corporation, accessed August 24, 2016, 
https://www.mcc.gov/about.  
7 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” The American Economic Review 90, 
no. 4 (September, 2000): 864. 
8 “Development Finance Data,” Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, accessed 
August 24, 2016, http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/.  
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Chinese aid, in contrast, is less transparent and more loosely defined. The foreign 
aid mechanisms that modern China has established are similar in function to OECD-DAC 
aid but do not follow the same definitions. China gives aid with a wider selection of 
vehicles, including grants, concessional loans, preferential financing for Chinese 
infrastructure firms, and subsidized export credits.9 Some of the aid China extends would 
qualify as ODA, were it an OECD-DAC member: Debt relief, grants, zero-interest loans, 
and concessional loans are among China’s assistance portfolio. China also uses 
instruments that would qualify as OOF, such as military aid and commercial market rate 
loans from state banks. Further, China employs strategic lines of credit to its state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) operating abroad. Because of the close relationships between the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its SOEs, China can carry out foreign aid-like 
activity using instruments the West would not consider foreign aid at all.10 
Every aspect of China’s aid programs is subtly different from its Western 
analogues. Because of a fundamental belief in sovereignty and noninterference in internal 
affairs, China generally does not impose political reform goals on recipients as a 
condition for receiving aid. Since China has elected not to align its definitions or reform 
requirements with the West, the literature generally categorizes China as an “emerging 
donor” along with other non-DAC-affiliated states.  
There are two other important differences between OECD-DAC aid and Chinese 
aid. First, China has distinctly different preferences for its aid instruments.11 Whereas 
OECD-DAC countries have a historic preference for ODA, Chinese aid primarily comes 
in OOF-like vehicles such as commercial-rate loans to recipient states otherwise too risky 
to obtain such loans, loans to Chinese export firms, and strategic lines of credit to 
                                                 
9 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2015), 78; Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa 
(Oxford: Oxford University, 2009), 297. 
10 Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How Much?” in 
Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Jane Golley and Ligang Song (Canberra: 
Australian National University, 2011), 205–7.  
11 China’s preference for OOF-like aid dates to the 1980s under the reforms begun by Deng Xiaoping, 
but has especially been its modus operandi since the turn of the 21st century. Previously, under Mao 
Zedong, China preferred outright grants for their ideological value. Aid under Mao is discussed in Chapters 
II and III of this thesis. 
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Chinese firms operating abroad.12 Second, China does not consistently publish its foreign 
aid, support for foreign-operating firms, or foreign direct investment (FDI) to the same 
extent as its OECD counterparts. Despite the breadth of China’s aid program, research 
into Chinese foreign aid is complicated by the chronic opacity of Chinese state affairs. 
This opacity requires the researcher to infer China’s activity, interests, and intent from 
spotty open source data. These data include aggregated research from scholars like John 
Copper, who compiled a nearly year-by-year accounting of Chinese aid delivery; from 
reports from recipient countries celebrating Chinese support; and from the public 
statements of China itself.13 None of these sources is a wholly reliable or complete 
account.   
Some scholars find that contrary to Burnside and Dollar’s findings, unconditional 
aid does not necessarily lead to inefficiency or corrosive governance. In The Dragon’s 
Gift, Deborah Brautigam notes that, “China does not claim to know what Africa must do 
to develop. China has argued that it was wrong to impose political and economic 
conditionality in exchange for aid, and that countries should be free to find their own 
pathway out of poverty.”14 The pathway that China offers is frequently paved with 
construction projects: Brautigam argues that since China prefers to fund tangible projects 
selected by recipient states rather than offer fungible (and embezzleable) monetary 
support, Chinese aid does not exacerbate corruption or human rights abuses.15 Ngaire 
Woods defends China’s respect for sovereignty and lack of conditionality as an attractive 
arrangement for recipient states. She finds that aid from emerging donors, including 
China, does not necessarily result in poor aid outcomes (including health, environmental, 
and corruption concerns) and that emerging donors do not deliberately attempt to 
overturn existing systems or subvert norms.16 Stephen Kaplan notes that unconditional 
                                                 
12 Brautigam, “Chinese Development Aid in Africa,” 206–7. 
13 Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. II. 
14 Brautigam, Dragon’s Gift, 308. 
15 Ibid., 284–87, 292–97.  
16 Ngaire Woods, “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution 
in Development Assistance,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 84, no. 6 
(November 1, 2008): 1205–1221, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00765.x. 
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Chinese funding represents patient capital that allows the recipient states to manage their 
finances as they see fit, but that the type of funding (that is, state-to-state vs. private firm 
funding) influences the manner in which recipient states invest their new funds.17 
Responding to concerns that aid fragmentation (that is, redundant and uncoordinated aid 
efforts from multiple donors) is poor practice, Jin Sato et al. point out that simultaneous 
(and even redundant) activity of DAC and emerging donors need not be a bad state of 
affairs; they find that “emerging donors are offering recipients a choice, thereby 
activating healthy competition among donors.”18 
Other scholars are more concerned about the development and reform outcomes 
of unconditional aid, regardless of the manner in which China delivers it. Moisés Naím 
describes Chinese aid as “rogue,” citing a Chinese railway project in Nigeria that 
displaced the World Bank’s effort to reform Nigeria’s “notoriously corrupt and 
inefficient” government.19 Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner describe the challenge that 
Chinese aid poses to Western reform efforts: “China’s foreign assistance and private 
investments arrive free of ‘good governance’ conditionality, thereby undermining the 
very mechanisms through which the United States has sought to advance liberal practices 
around the globe.”20 Sophie Richardson notes that China’s respect for sovereignty and 
pursuit of economic development over civil rights leads it to support human rights 
abusers.21 In Cambodia’s case, Sophal Ear agrees, “Cambodia is on the cusp of 
proclaiming ‘We don’t care about your aid’ to Western donors as it falls under the 
                                                 
17 Kaplan’s first case is Venezuela, which receives direct state-to-state funding from China, the patient 
nature of which allows it to increase its deficit spending and economic intervention. His second case is 
Brazil, the constitution of which limits state-to-state funding in favor of private funding, leading Brazil to 
remain more fiscally disciplined than Venezuela. Stephen B. Kaplan, “Banking Unconditionally: The 
Political Economy of Chinese Finance in Latin America,” Review of International Political Economy 
(September 1, 2016), doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1216005.  
18 Jin Sato, Hiroaki Shiga, Takaaki Kobayashi, and Hisahiro Kondoh, “‘Emerging Donors’ from a 
Recipient Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia,” World Development 39, no. 
12 (December, 2011): 2091–2104, doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.04.014. 
19 Moisés Naím, “Rogue Aid,” Foreign Policy 159 (March/April 2007): 95–96, 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/224026979/fulltext/46D468FC0F324C68PQ/1?accountid=12702.   
20 Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner, “China’s Illiberal Challenge,” Democracy Journal (Fall 2006): 
63. 
21 Sophie Richardson, “Challenges for a ‘Responsible Power,’” Human Rights Watch, accessed 
August 24, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/china/china.pdf.  
 8
influence of China and other lenders who have no interest in upholding human rights or 
democratic values.”22 
The aid outcome debate focuses on the experience of the recipient state. 
Advocates for China’s emerging aid programs argue that China can and should join the 
international community on its own terms. On the other hand, skeptics argue that China’s 
respect for sovereignty leads Chinese aid to dilute or displace Western efforts to spur 
development and reform with conditional aid.  
2. Policy Objectives 
Scholars also debate whether Chinese aid presents a policy challenge to the 
United States and the West. As opposed to the aid outcomes discussed above, which 
reflect the recipient state’s experience, policy objectives are the donor state’s purpose in 
giving aid. Whether Chinese aid challenges the international order or conflicts with U.S. 
priorities hinges on its effect on China’s priorities, goals, and effectiveness at achieving 
them. 
The spectrum of the policy objective debate is similar to the aid outcome debate: 
Characterizations of Chinese aid range between benevolence and malevolence. Thomas 
Christensen argues that Chinese aid has no sinister element: China’s failure to integrate 
into the Western foreign aid paradigm is not deliberate subversion. Instead, China’s novel 
aid system presents an opportunity for engagement, which Christensen admits is difficult 
with a bureaucracy as Byzantine as China’s. Further, he sees little evidence of China 
buying influence as a self-serving goal.23 Joshua Kurlantzick grants that gaining influence 
is one of China’s goals, but interprets this pursuit as an essentially benign exercise in 
building soft power and goodwill for common benefit.24 Using aid to secure preferential 
rights for resource extraction is another accusation of self-interest leveled at China, an 
interpretation that Brautigam rejects. She notes that securing resources from Africa 
                                                 
22 Sophal Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia (New York: Columbia University, 2013), 134. 
23 Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 2015), 74–81, 160–162. 
24 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World 
(New Haven: Yale University, 2008). 
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appears not to be a driving motivator behind aid delivery, and that mutual benefit through 
business relationships is more important to China than resource extraction.25  
Barma and Ratner are substantially more skeptical. Beyond the potential for 
reform derailment and inefficiency noted above, they theorize that China’s unconditional 
aid and respect for sovereignty represent a new ideology that directly challenges the 
liberal order that has dominated the world since the end of the Cold War.26 Sebastian 
Strangio sees the same landscape in Cambodia, writing “Beijing’s global New Deal… 
seems almost tailor-made for Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, a strongman autocrat 
who chafes at Western pressure to enact democratic reforms.”27 Chinese aid, Strangio 
argues, draws Phnom Penh into Beijing’s orbit, resulting in Cambodian deference to 
Chinese issues like the pacification of Uighurs (twenty of whom Cambodia deported to 
China) and the isolation of Taiwan (with which Hun Sen forbids his provincial officials 
to interact).28 
China’s spread of its own worldview may not be a new phenomenon. Copper 
traces evidence of China’s original foreign aid victory: The diplomatic isolation of 
Taiwan. Shortly after its establishment, and despite its abject poverty, China began to 
gather support for its sovereignty over Taiwan with distribution of aid. Cambodia was an 
early beneficiary of China’s aid campaign to isolate Taiwan.29 This trend continues as 
China draws small United Nations (UN) member states into its sphere of influence.30 
Brautigam, too, traces the checkbook diplomacy contest between China and Taiwan.31 
                                                 
25 Brautigam, Dragon’s Gift, 277–81. 
26 Barma and Ratner, “China’s Illiberal Challenge.”  
27 Sebastian Strangio, “China’s Aid Emboldens Cambodia,” Yale Global Online, accessed May 16, 
2012, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-aid-emboldens-cambodia.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Copper, China’s Foreign Aid, 149–50. 
30 Shannon Tiezzi, “Why Taiwan’s Allies are Flocking to Beijing,” The Diplomat, November 19, 
2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-taiwans-allies-are-flocking-to-beijing/; Lucy Hornby and Luc 
Cohen, “No Ties? No Problem as China Courts Taiwan’s Remaining Allies,” Reuters, 6 August 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-centralamerica-idUSBRE97514C20130806.  
31 Brautigam, Dragon’s Gift, 34, 67–68, 165. 
 10
3. International Relations 
International relations theory can shed light on how and why foreign aid can be 
used to pursue national interests. In The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt describes 
foreign aid as one form of balancing behavior. However, he argues that aid is not a 
critically important lever, because even vulnerable and dependent client states have 
significant freedom of action. Additionally, promises of aid are eclipsed by the balance of 
threat. Generally, foreign aid is less important that other realist factors; when it is 
important, it is a result of alliances, not the cause of them.32 Hans Morgenthau is less 
dismissive in his discussion of foreign aid as a political tool. He traces the evolution of 
outright bribery into six modern, distinct flavors of foreign aid, including military, 
prestige, and developmental aid. In order for aid to be effective, he argues, the type of aid 
delivered must be matched with the donor’s and recipient’s situation. For example, long-
term developmental aid may not prop up a dictator, whereas a useless but highly visible 
prestige project may keep his regime in power.33 
This section has surveyed literature in three debates: The aid outcomes from 
China’s foreign aid programs, the policy objectives that China pursues with foreign aid, 
and the value of foreign aid in international relations theory. This literature informs this 
thesis’s approach to the analysis of China’s use of foreign aid to pursue national interests. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis tests the primary hypothesis that China employs foreign aid to 
influence recipient states’ political behavior to serve China’s interests and that China’s 
expansion of influence conflicts with U.S. national interests. As part of this, an 
intermediate hypothesis is that the financial mechanisms it wields may indicate 
something about Chinese intentions for that aid. In other words, adversarial Chinese 
expansion of soft power might be distinguishable from benign development activity by its 
                                                 
32 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1990). 
33 Hans Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” The American Political Science Review 56, 
no. 2 (June, 1962): 301–309, doi:10.2307/1952366.  
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choices of aid instrument (such as cash, infrastructure projects, prestige projects, or 
military support).  
These hypotheses assume that China has an interest in expanding its regional 
influence. The United States’ interest would be to maintain worldwide influence, 
including in Asia. This could create a zero-sum environment in which China’s increase in 
influence comes at a cost of other parties’ influence (United States, UN, ASEAN, or 
otherwise). China might then employ foreign aid to increase its influence at the United 
States’ expense. Further, the manner in which China delivers aid to buy influence would 
be qualitatively, observably different from financing for other purposes, such as 
development or mutually beneficial business relationships. 
This thesis tests its hypotheses in two cases: Kenya and Cambodia. In Kenya, the 
author expects to find that China’s single biggest historic foreign policy concern was 
Kenya’s affirmation of the One China Policy and recognition of the PRC, and that the aid 
instruments used in building support for the One China Policy in the 1960s would be 
distinct from those supporting subsequent development-oriented aid activity there. In 
Cambodia, the author expects that China has bought influence and pursued a richer, more 
diverse array of issues with aid, and that the types of aid sent to Cambodia to build 
China’s influence will be similar across cases of Chinese influence purchase, such as One 
China Policy support, ASEAN influence, or South China Sea activity. The hypotheses to 
be tested are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Hypotheses Across Cases 
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If validated by evidence, the practical value of the primary hypothesis (that 
Chinese aid buys international influence at America’s expense) is that U.S. policy makers 
could better understand, anticipate, and counteract China’s expansion of soft power. The 
value of the intermediate hypothesis (that China’s choice of aid instrument correlates 
with the political objective) would be greater discrimination of China’s soft power 
expansion from China’s development or business programs. So to speak, this 
discrimination would allow U.S. analysts to distinguish threatening wheat from benign 
chaff. 
In the null case of the primary hypothesis, the evidence would show that China 
does not employ foreign aid and investment to buy regional influence (or, more weakly, 
the evidence may show that an observer cannot determine whether Chinese aid buys 
influence at all). In one possible null case, evidence may show that China employs aid 
and investment in accordance with its narrow economic interests, and perhaps 
secondarily is influenced by economic interdependence arguments and participation in 
intergovernmental organizations. In Chinese terms, this null case could suggest that 
Chinese aid and investment genuinely follows the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, including mutual non-interference, equality and cooperation for mutual 
benefit, and peaceful co-existence. In this case, China’s foreign aid campaigns, trade 
deals, and investment activity would innocently support China’s own economic 
development at no cost to U.S. national interests. 
In the null case of the intermediate hypothesis, China’s choice of aid instrument 
would correlate poorly (or not at all) with the aid’s apparent political objective. The 
consequence of this null case would be that U.S. policy makers would be unable to 
distinguish what type of aid China prefers when buying influence vs. encouraging 
development. 
The underlying logic of the argument is this: Chinese aid is a problem for the 
United States if and only if 1) China’s goals conflict with Western goals and China 
achieves those goals by employing aid, or 2) Chinese aid displaces Western aid and 
Chinese aid outcomes are poorer than Western outcomes. Proposition 1, in other words, 
is the hypothesis that China pursues, with foreign aid, policies with that conflict with 
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Washington. The hypothesis in this section primarily follows this line of argument. 
Proposition 2 is the debate that Chinese aid leaves a recipient state worse off than DAC 
aid; elements of this proposition, including outcomes and reforms such as public health, 
infrastructure, or transparency, are addressed as a secondary matter. 
To validate the hypothesis that Chinese interests conflict with those of the United 
States, this thesis need not show that China deliberately disrupts American interests. 
Malicious intent is one way in which national interests can threaten each other, but so too 
is incidental misalignment. To determine deliberate, adversarial, anti-American intent 
behind China’s pursuit of interests would be highly speculative because of the opacity of 
Chinese statecraft. As an example, Beijing may deliberately wield foreign aid to seduce a 
country away from U.S. alignment, but it may also influence that country’s behavior in a 
way that only incidentally conflicts with the United States. In either case, there would be 
erosion of Western influence. Speculation about China’s actual intent is unnecessary 
because the logic of the argument only requires conflict of interest, whether that conflict 
is intentional or incidental. It would be sufficient to show that Chinese policies conflict 
with American interests by unintended consequence. Thus, this thesis avoids using 
phrases like “the threat of Chinese aid” that assume or imply mens rea. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines how and why China gives foreign aid. Because China’s aid 
program is so complex (aid, loans, direct investment, and commercial subsidies to 93 
countries), limiting the scope of study is required. This study focuses on a comparison of 
Chinese activity in Kenya and Cambodia.  
Kenya is one case because it had one major foreign policy interaction that 
dwarfed other Chinese concerns there: The affirmation of the One China Policy. Since 
the 1950s, the PRC has waged a campaign to gain bilateral diplomatic recognition with 
every country it could and to gain multilateral recognition in the United Nations and other 
international organizations, all in the service of asserting itself as the single government 
of China, isolating the Republic of China (ROC), and relegating Taiwan to Chinese 
provincial status. China conducted this campaign in large part with bilateral foreign aid to 
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gain individual states’ recognition. The PRC essentially achieved this goal by 2008, when 
ROC President Chen Shui-ban left office and Ma Ying-jeou, Chen’s successor, sought 
rapprochement with the PRC in the cross-Strait dollar diplomacy battle.34 
One target of the PRC’s campaign was Kenya, which in 1964, along with a 
range of other African states, formally recognized the PRC and broke ties with the 
ROC.35 With that recognition, China’s state-to-state mission in Kenya was complete. 
Since 1964, China has imposed no further conditions on aid to Kenya beyond continuing 
the latter’s One China Policy support.36 China has remained active in Kenya, but the 
nature of its activity has been largely investment by Chinese firms rather than direct state-
to-state aid.37  
Cambodia is the other case. Cambodia was also among China’s original foreign 
aid beneficiaries. It is one of China’s closest friends in ASEAN and shares the Mekong 
River, which is both a major natural resource and a potential point of conflict for both 
countries.  
1. Similarities between Cambodia and Kenya: History, Economy, and 
Resources 
a. Colonial Backgrounds 
Cambodia and Kenya share similar backgrounds as former European colonies. 
Each was an underdeveloped agricultural outpost of a European empire until gaining 
independence, by negotiation and by violence, respectively, in the post-World War II 
demise of imperialism. With respect to anti-imperialist sentiment and revolutionary 
ideology, China is likely to have viewed Cambodia and Kenya as historically similar. 
                                                 
34 Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. II, 168–69. 
35 Ibid., 151. 
36 Joseph Onjala A Scoping Study on China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of Kenya, (Nairobi: 




37 Ibid., 21, 38. 
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Cambodia was a part of French Indochina from 1887 to 1954, during which time 
France expended little effort to develop Cambodia beyond its agricultural economy. What 
infrastructure the French did build supported plantation operations and rubber, rice, and 
corn exports.38 Colonial authorities did little to improve literacy rates or quality of life for 
Cambodians, whose main interaction with colonial authority was burdensome taxation.39 
Between 1947 and 1953, Norodom Sihanouk negotiated Cambodia’s independence in a 
series of treaties and diplomatic visits to Paris.40 Sihanouk held a number of leadership 
positions, including Prime Minister and King of Cambodia.  
Kenya was a British colony from 1885 to 1963, during which time the British 
built Kenya as an agricultural center, with corresponding road and railway projects to 
support trade from inland (including from Uganda) to the coast. The Crown’s policy 
expropriated the best farmland for white settlers. Local protests against these policies 
peaked in the Mau Mau Rebellion of the 1950s, when Jomo Kenyatta and other leaders 
led an armed resistance movement against colonial rule.41  In response to that pressure, 
Britain allowed Kenya increasing autonomy until finally granting independence as a 
commonwealth nation in 1963–64. Kenyatta became Kenya’s first president. 
Although both countries shared similar backgrounds as agrarian colonies, their 
political evolutions as independent states followed distinct paths. Cambodia endured a 
turbulent series of dictatorships against the backdrop of warfare against both domestic 
guerillas and external adversaries.42 Sihanouk acted as king, prime minister, and head of 
state until his overthrow and exile in 1970. Between 1970 and 1989, regional war 
enveloped Cambodia and contributed to political chaos there, most notably the Khmer 
Rouge’s atrocities of the late 1970s and the Vietnamese occupation of the 1980s.43 
                                                 
38 Russell Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, 1987), 19–20, https://www.loc.gov/item/89600150/?q=cambodia.  
39 Ibid., 20. 
40 Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study, 23–25. 
41 Country Profile: Kenya (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, June 
2007), 2, https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Kenya.pdf.  
42 Ross, ed., Cambodia: A Country Study, 26, 43–44. 
43 Peter M. Worthing, “Strange Bedfellows: China and Cambodia since 1949,” American Asian 
Review 18, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 20–26, 62–65, Proquest (211389313). 
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Hun Sen, Cambodia’s current dictator, rose to power in the 1980s and has controlled the 
country in a time of relative peace.  
Kenya’s post-colonial government was also authoritarian. An armed rebellion in 
the 1950s led to Kenya’s emancipation from the British Empire. Kenya’s ostensibly 
democratic government evolved into an autocracy under Kenyatta.44 Unlike in 
Cambodia, leftist factions failed to establish a foothold for communism, and Kenyatta 
maintained the power of his right-wing regime. Shortly after independence, Kenya’s 
rejection of communism contributed to a freeze in Sino-Kenyan relations that lasted until 
the 1980s.45  
b. Economies 
Cambodia and Kenya have similar economies, although Cambodia has recently 
shown better growth of income and industrial productivity. Data is scarce prior to the 
1990s, especially for Cambodia. Insofar as data can show, Cambodia and Kenya are both 
low-income agricultural states with limited industrial productivity. 
Cambodia has shown signs of growth and development in the past two and a half 
decades. From 1993 to 2015, Cambodia’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew from 
$3.1 billion to $15.9 billion, with an average annual growth rate of around 7.5 percent. 
GDP per capita climbed from $315 to $1,020 during that period at an annual rate of 
5.5 percent.46 Agriculture has given way to light industry, driven largely by increased 
garment production, while services have remained static.47 Cambodia’s exports include 
low-value-added products like garments, timber, and rubber.48 
                                                 
44 Country Profile: Kenya, 2–4. 
45 Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History since Independence (London: I. B. Taurus & Co, 2012), 151, 
158, 177–78. 
46 Gapminder World, accessed September 9, 2016, https://www.gapminder.org/world/. 
47 Sophal Ear, Aid Dependence in Cambodia (New York: Columbia University, 2013), 58–86; 
Gapminder World, accessed September 9, 2016, https://www.gapminder.org/world/. 
48 “Cambodia,” CIA World Factbook, updated 12 January 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cb.html.  
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Kenya has maintained slower GDP growth during the same period. From 1993 to 
2015, Kenya’s GDP grew from $22 billion to $52.2 billion, with an average annual 
growth rate of around 4 percent. That GDP growth appears to have been largely a 
function of population growth; GDP per capita climbed from $851 to $1,130 at only 
1.3 percent annually during that period.49 Kenya’s economic sectors have remained 
nearly static at around 30 percent agriculture, 20 percent industry, and 50 percent 
service.50 Like Cambodia, Kenya’s main exports are low-value-added commodities, 
including sisal, coffee beans, tea, and hides.51 
GDP, economic sector divisions, and other economic indicators are difficult to 
compare before the 1990s. In his study of ASEAN growth, Khorshed Chowdhury finds 
that Cambodia’s per capita GDP from 1987 to 2001 grew at 2.17 percent annually, while 
Gapminder shows Kenya’s per capita GDP growth rate to be 1.8 percent over the same 
period. Each source grants that their data may not be reliable. Chowdhury’s data for 
Cambodia only begins at 1984.52 The World Bank’s data for Cambodia has similar 
problems, suffering from large data gaps for GDP between 1974 and 1993 and gross 
national income per capita before 1995.53 Cambodia’s violence and upheaval have 
obscured decades of its economic history. 
c. Natural Resources 
Neither Cambodia nor Kenya are major natural resource exporters. In each 
country, rents from natural resources as a percentage of GDP almost entirely comprise 
forestry rents and have been similar for decades (accounting for 4 percent and 3 percent 
of Cambodian and Kenyan GDP, respectively).54 Because neither country is a major 
                                                 
49 Gapminder World, accessed September 9, 2016, https://www.gapminder.org/world/. 
50 Gapminder World. 
51 Joseph Onjala, “The Impact of China-Africa Trade Relations: The Case of Kenya,” AERC 
Collaborative Research China-Africa Project 5 (November 2010), 2. 
52 Khorshed Chowdhury, “What’s Happening to Per Capita GDP in the ASEAN Countries? An 
Analysis of Convergence, 1960–2001,” Applied Econometrics and International Development 5, no. 3 
(2005): 51, http://www.usc.es/economet/reviews/aeid533.pdf; Gapminder World, accessed September 9, 
2016, https://www.gapminder.org/world/.  
53 “Cambodia,” The World Bank, 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/country/cambodia.  
54 Index Mundi, accessed September 9, 2016, http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators.  
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source of resources like petrochemicals or precious minerals, which frequently generate 
geopolitical action, China is likely to have similar foreign policies toward Cambodia and 
Kenya with respect to resource extraction. 
2. Differences between Cambodia and Kenya: Geographic, Political, and 
Cultural Proximity to China 
China has more reasons to exert its influence in Cambodia than in Kenya. As a 
Southeast Asian state, Cambodia’s geographic proximity to China means the two have 
more frequent political interactions as well.55 By virtue of their being regional neighbors, 
China and Cambodia both are affected by a number of foreign policy issues, including 
ASEAN decisions, South China Sea usage, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area membership, 
Mekong River development and, during the Cold War, regional great power politics. East 
Africa also has its share of regional political problems, but China has much less at stake 
in their outcomes.  
Geographic proximity also leads to cultural similarity. The Khmer Empire was a 
tributary vassal of ancient China as early as the third century, and Cambodian Buddhism 
incorporates elements of Confucianism, one of China’s foundational philosophies.56 In 
the 1960s and 1970s, ethnic Chinese were Cambodia’s largest minority. That population 
suffered badly under the Khmer Rouge, and today, 2.5 percent of Cambodia is ethnically 
Chinese.57 If there is a cultural component to foreign policy and the degree to which 
states cooperate with or oppose one another, that component would be more pronounced 
between China and Cambodia than between China and Kenya. 
Because Cambodia and Kenya are in many ways similar states but distinct in the 
distance of their orbits around Beijing, Chinese aid to each country should yield insights 
about how and why China employs aid and investment. If China predominantly uses 
                                                 
55 Proximity does not imply affinity, of course; rather, proximate states have more intersections of 
interests and more opportunities for both cooperation and conflict, ceteris paribus.  
56 “Chinese Tributary States,” Global Security, accessed 29 August 2017, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/history-tributary-states.htm; Ross, ed., Cambodia: A 
Country Study, 122.  
57 Sigfrido Burgos and Sophal Ear, “China’s Strategic Interests in Cambodia,” Asian Survey 50, no. 3 
(May/June 2010), 616–17. 
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foreign aid to buy influence and pursue narrow national interests, one would expect to 
find more aid to be delivered to Cambodia, a state whose foreign policy issues have much 
greater overlap with Chinese concerns compared to Kenya’s. Conversely, if China 
predominantly uses aid to spur development or business relationships, one would expect 
to find aid delivered to Cambodia and Kenya according to their developmental need or 
trade partnership potential. An examination of the history of the PRC’s support of each 
country should yield insights about where China’s aid priorities lie. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This thesis asks three questions: What has China achieved, and what does it hope 
to achieve, with its economic statecraft? Do China’s choices of aid instrument indicate its 
political intent? And does Chinese aid present a challenge to the United States and its 
interests? To answer these questions, this thesis examines China’s aid and investment 
activity in Cambodia and Kenya since their independence from colonial rule. Chapter II 
examines China’s complex pursuit of its own interests in Cambodia since 1949. Chapter 
III examines China’s sporadic relationship with Kenya since 1964. Chapter IV examines 
the U.S. interests that may be challenged by China’s economic statecraft, evaluate this 
thesis’s hypotheses, and draw conclusions from China’s behavior in its interaction with 
Cambodia and Kenya. 
In examining China’s foreign aid activity, comparing across diverse sources can 
aid analysis. The chronic opacity of China’s state activity (not to mention the language 
barrier of original Chinese sources) requires an appeal to the broader literature, including 
reported connections between Chinese aid and recipient state actions. The argument is 
couched in reinterpretation of existing literature with an emphasis on what it means for 
Cambodia, Kenya, China, the United States, and the world.  
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II. CHINA’S INTERESTS IN CAMBODIA 
What interests does China pursue in Cambodia?58 This chapter examines the 
China-Cambodia dyad in the issue-areas of One China Policy support, Cold War politics, 
South China Sea maritime claims, and Mekong development disputes. These issues are a 
representative set of interests that China has had in Cambodia since 1949. Further, these 
dyadic interests reflect Chinese national interests writ large. They span major periods for 
the People’s Republic: its inception as a new state, its involvement in Cold War great 
power politics in the 1960s and 1970s, its post-Mao shift from revolutionary ideology to 
pragmatic development, and its ambition as a world power. They reflect the core issues of 
Chinese sovereignty and status in the South China Sea. In each case, this chapter outlines 
the issue, introduce China’s engagement with Cambodia to pursue its interest, and frame 
China’s interest in terms of international relations theory. This chapter argues that 
Chinese aid to Cambodia played an important role in building international support for 
Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, hedging against Soviet and Vietnamese expansion 
during the Cold War, advancing Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and softening 
resistance to Mekong River dam projects. 
A. PURSUIT OF ONE CHINA 
Of China’s foreign policy concerns, building international support for the 
legitimate sovereignty of the PRC over all of China, including Taiwan, is among the most 
important. Foreign aid is one tool that the PRC uses to gather and maintain that 
international support. In 1956, Cambodia became the first state whose diplomatic 
recognition China courted with aid. 
China’s policy of reunification with Taiwan is codified in, among other places, a 
white paper called “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China.”59 Published in 
                                                 
58 This thesis refers to Cambodia both by that name and by the particular names it adopted as it 
changed regimes. Cambodia’s many names, for reference: Kingdom of Cambodia (1953–1970), Khmer 
Republic (1970–1975), Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979), People’s Republic of Kampuchea (1979–
1989), the State of Cambodia (1989–1993), and the Kingdom of Cambodia again (1993–present). 
59 “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China,” Taiwan Affairs Office & Information Office, 
State Council, People’s Republic of China, August 1993, http://china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm.  
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1993, it outlines the PRC’s view of the modern cross-strait situation and its intentions. 
This document defines Taiwan as having been a part of China since antiquity, briefly 
expropriated but rightfully repatriated to China—the one true China, with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) administering the only rightful sovereign government—after 
World War II. China’s white paper goes on to reiterate China’s intent to resolve the 
Taiwan question peacefully, but emphasizes China’s frustration with the Kuomintang’s 
(KMT) flight from China, its periodic flirtation with Taiwanese independence, the 
intervention and partiality of the United States, and U.S. disruption of peaceful 
negotiation of Taiwan’s return to the Chinese fold. The One China policy remains the 
official policy of the People’s Republic. For several decades after the KMT’s retreat, it 
was also the policy of the ROC that there was but one China and the KMT was its 
rightful government. The Taiwan Question remains unresolved as the last remaining 
artifact of China’s century of humiliation. Aside from several crises in the Taiwan Strait, 
China’s approach to reunification has been largely peaceful and diplomatic. 
That diplomatic approach hinged on internationally isolating the ROC by insisting 
on states’ diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic, one state at a time. In 1954, 
Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai attended the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, 
Indonesia. In attendance were 29 states representing over 1.5 billion people; absent were 
the United States and the Soviet Union. In the next decade, China would extend 
diplomatic overtures to many of them. The Bandung Conference helped Zhou and the 
PRC realize the enormous potential of numerous small allies in a world otherwise 
dominated by bipolar great power politics.60 These overtures occurred in two phases: 
First, from 1956 to 1971, the PRC pursued the support of enough states to secure the 
China seat in the United Nations General Assembly from the ROC; next, from 1972 to 
2008, China continued to foster growing community of states that recognized the PRC’s 
sovereignty over Taiwan.  
The first of those alliances to bear fruit was with Cambodia. In 1956, shortly after 
the PRC had abandoned near terms efforts to reunify with Taiwan by force, China put the 
                                                 
60 J. H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s 
(London: Cambridge University, 1975), 161–62. 
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lessons it learned in Bandung to use. It began extending diplomatic overtures to states in 
which it had no obvious national interest. The first volley in that checkbook diplomacy 
campaign was China’s overture to Cambodia. In 1956, China issued a $22.5 million 
non-repayable grant to Cambodia.61 China followed up on its first grant in 1958 and 1960 
with additional pledges of $5.6 million and $26.5 million in aid to Cambodia, 
respectively, along with dozens of construction projects for a radio tower, rail lines, 
factories, hospitals, and other infrastructure.62 Despite China’s poverty at the time, Mao 
strongly preferred grants as foreign aid instruments, since they offered a much friendlier 
public relations appearance than market rate, subsidized, or even interest-free loans.63 
The amount of pledged aid actually delivered is unclear, but any aid at all was generous 
when China was beset by its own profound difficulties during the Great Leap Forward.64  
That series of aid flows to Cambodia in the mid-1950s was the first round in a 
foreign aid campaign that was expensive for both the People’s Republic and for Taiwan, 
which attempted the same checkbook diplomacy strategy for the same reason. In 1958, 
Cambodia severed ties to the ROC and recognized the PRC. Two years later, Cambodia 
voiced support for the PRC’s assumption of China’s seat at the UN. Dozens more states 
followed suit, and in 1971, the UN expelled the ROC and admitted the PRC as the voice 
of China.65 This was the first shift in a cascade of abandonment of Taiwan that lasted for 
five more decades. Because both Chinese governments demanded diplomatic recognition 
exclusive of the other, Cambodia’s shift of recognition from Taiwan to China was the 
first of many zero-sum victories for the legitimacy of the People’s Republic. During the 
ensuing five decades, China and Taiwan would continue the struggle China began in 
Cambodia, bilaterally courting small states to entice their acceptance of the One China 
policy. China’s checkbook diplomacy campaign was a success. In the end, China remains 
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64 Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. II, 17. 
65 UN General Assembly, Resolution 2758, Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic 
of China in the United Nations. Twenty-Sixth Session (25 October 1971), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement.  
 24
divided, but the People’s Republic is otherwise in an indisputably better diplomatic 
position: It holds China’s seat in the United Nations and has received the diplomatic 
recognition of almost every state on earth.66  
Foreign aid was not solely responsible for China’s international recognition, of 
course. The Cold War was another major factor in China’s success. China’s two greatest 
coups were assuming their seat at the UN and winning rapprochement with and the 
recognition of the United States. The opinion of the latter was swayed by China’s value 
in the Cold War, not by grants.67 However, 56 non-Communist Bloc countries shifted 
their recognition from Taiwan to China even before China won its UN seat, and Chinese 
foreign aid was a major factor in those successes. 
China’s checkbook diplomacy campaign to isolate Taiwan serves both realist and 
constructed national interests. China’s reunification with Taiwan appears at first blush to 
be a realist concern: A larger state seeking to coerce a smaller rival in order to expand its 
territory and industrial capacity, only to be thwarted by a hegemonic offshore balancer.68 
More illustrative, though, is the constructed symbolism of Taiwan as a painful reminder 
of national humiliation. Zheng Wang argues that the CCP reinforces a narrative of chosen 
trauma that defines the people’s identity, and that the resulting nationalism is a key 
element of CCP legitimacy.69 China’s trauma was its fall from glory, and its mission (and 
one raison d’être of the CCP) is to restore itself as the Middle Kingdom. That restoration 
requires being whole. China’s motives for reunification, and its bilateral pursuit of 
foreign support, are not merely material or realist but also deeply nationalist. 
In summary, beginning with aid to Cambodia in 1956, China pursued an 
aggressive checkbook diplomacy campaign designed to draw support away from the 
ROC and build the legitimacy of the People’s Republic. For the most part, this aid’s only 
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explicit condition was that the recipient diplomatically recognize China and support its 
One China Policy. Although larger forces were at play, including U.S. recognition of 
China as a Cold War confederate, Chinese foreign aid was a major factor in gathering 
international support.  
B. CAMBODIA AS A COLD WAR COUNTERWEIGHT 
The Sino-Soviet Split was a major driver of Southeast Asian politics during the 
Cold War. Between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, China’s ideology and politics had 
diverged from that of the Soviet Union, turning China’s greatest ally into its greatest 
security threat.70 China worried intensely about Soviet involvement in Southeast Asian 
politics. It also worried about Soviet-supported Vietnamese aspirations of regional 
hegemony and communist unity. Toward the end of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union 
had replaced China as North Vietnam’s greatest benefactor.71 New Cold War alignments 
formed in Asia in the 1970s, particularly after China’s rapprochement with the United 
States in 1972 and Vietnam’s Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet 
Union in 1978. China’s greatest concerns in the region were Soviet encirclement and 
Vietnamese expansion.72 One of China’s responses to this encirclement was its 
relationship with Cambodia. 
Cambodia’s and China’s interests in Cold War non-alignment and sovereignty 
paralleled each other in the mid-twentieth century. Norodom Sihanouk, at various times 
Cambodia’s king, prince, prime minister, and head of state, carried out a struggle for 
Cambodian independence, first from French rule and then from Vietnamese occupation.73 
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Mao, an outspoken critic of Western imperialism and Soviet revisionism, had led China 
to independence and advocated for the sovereignty of non-aligned states.74 China’s 
support of sovereignty appealed to Sihanouk, who would increasingly look northward for 
political support.75 
Lon Nol, prime minister and once Sihanouk’s closest friend in the Cambodian 
army, staged a coup in 1970 while Sihanouk was traveling abroad. The Khmer Republic 
was established, and Sihanouk established the Royal Government of the National Union 
of Kampuchea (GRUNK), his government in exile in Beijing. GRUNK and the Khmer 
Rouge, formerly domestic rivals, became allies of convenience in opposition to Khmer 
Republic.76 Between 1970 and 1975, the Khmer Republic defended itself from a 
domestic communist insurgency supported by North Vietnam on one hand and by 
GRUNK and China on the other. 
China hosted Sihanouk’s government in exile while supporting the Cambodian 
insurgency. That insurgency restored a China-friendly Democratic Kampuchea in 1975, 
but it did not create a perfect alignment of interests. The Khmer Rouge and China never, 
at any point, had much affection for each other; the Khmer Rouge were more inclined 
toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union than toward China or Sihanouk himself, 
which created tension when the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk, and China found themselves 
supporting each other.77 Vietnam helped cement their mutual support when it began 
initiating border clashes in 1977 and finally invaded Kampuchea in December 1978.78 
Chinese aid continued to play a large part in its regional diplomacy. Between 
1966 and 1968, China pledged some $77 million in grants and military support to the 
Kingdom of Cambodia. While in exile in Beijing, GRUNK received some $30 million in 
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aid, some of which may have flowed to Cambodian areas controlled by the Khmer 
Rouge. China ceased all aid activity to Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic. In 1975, after the 
Khmer Rouge assumed power, China pledged an unprecedented $1 billion interest-free 
loan to Cambodia, now called Democratic Kampuchea, and an additional $20 million as a 
gift.79 Beijing also pledged military gifts in kind to the new regime, including patrol 
boats, vehicles, artillery pieces, and small arms.80 As with all Chinese aid, it is unclear 
how much pledged aid China actually delivered. 
In 1975, Vietnam became hostile to the Khmer Rouge whose insurgency it 
had supported. Vietnam and Cambodia clashed at their border, while Vietnam established 
ties with communist Laos. China became wary of Southeast Asian unification under 
Vietnam.81 At about the same time China offered its $1 billion loan to Democratic 
Kampuchea, China suspended its grants to Vietnam. Two years later, China suspended 
its loans to Vietnam as well, leaving Vietnam to become a wholly dependent Soviet 
client state.  
Chinese aid to Cambodia and to Vietnam during the Cold War is difficult to 
measure and compare accurately. The literature offers data in several forms. Copper and 
Bartke, the most detailed data sets available, examine individual pledges of aid and the 
context in which they were extended. By their estimate, the sum of China’s line item 
spending in Cambodia between 1956 and 1977 is $1.4 billion.82 This is a low estimate, 
because in addition to discrete grants and loans, China also offered in-kind military aid 
and technical assistance whose monetary value is difficult to measure.  
In comparison, between 1949 and 1977, China extended some $576 million in 
discrete grants and loans to Vietnam, but China’s true expenditure was much higher: 
Including military expenditure, Copper estimates China spent between $1.5 and 
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$3.5 billion supporting Vietnam during the Vietnam War.83 An estimate from Chinese 
sources places that figure as high as $20 billion.84 Regardless of monetary value, data 
through the 1970s show a crescendo of aid to Cambodia and a reduction, then cessation, 
of aid to Vietnam as it reunified and expanded its regional power. 
In addition to financial assistance to GRUNK and the Khmer Rouge, China took 
direct military action to support Cambodia and contain Vietnam. In February and March 
1979, only a month after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, China responded by attacking 
Vietnam. China’s attack was limited, intended to punish Vietnam for its aggression.85 Its 
results were mixed: In four weeks of combat, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
suffered between 20,000 and 45,000 casualties, and the Vietnamese army between 44,000 
and 50,000. The PLA withdrew in March, having punished its neighbor but little more. 
China’s lackluster military operation may have cost Vietnam, but not dearly.86 Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia continued for a decade. 
Vietnam’s post-unification expenses were substantial, due in no small part to the 
high cost of maintaining its People’s Republic of Kampuchea regime while it was bled 
dry by a Chinese-supported insurgency there. By the time Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev normalized Sino-Soviet relations in 1989, a 
bankrupt Vietnam became unable to continue its occupation westward and departed 
Kampuchea entirely, leaving behind the State of Cambodia as an independent country.87 
China’s foreign aid activity toward Cambodia illustrates China’s geopolitical 
interests in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, Beijing used foreign 
aid to strengthen its relationship with Cambodia, as a complement to China’s support for 
North Vietnam. From 1970 to 1975, China maintained its relationship with Sihanouk and 
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with the Khmer Rouge as they tried to regain power, and aid followed; China and 
Vietnam found themselves supporting Cambodian communist resistance together. After 
1975, when Vietnamese policy became sharply hostile toward Democratic Kampuchea, 
Chinese aid supported Cambodia as a bulwark against Vietnamese expansion and Soviet 
influence. Chinese aid appears to comport with realist Cold War balancing behavior. 
C. PURSUIT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
The South China Sea is the site of a thick tangle of conflicting national interests. 
Around the Sea’s periphery are seven states with overlapping maritime claims, including 
assertions of control over hundreds of rocks, islets, and reefs. Among those claimant 
states is China, which claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, 
Scarborough Shoal and other features, against the objections and competing claims of 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Malaysia.88 In addition to its claims of 
sovereignty over individual features, China’s broadest and most famous claim in the 
South China Sea is to an ambiguous claim to the waters within its self-proclaimed “Nine 
Dash Line,” which encompasses most of the Sea. China defends its claims based on a 
liberal interpretation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which standardizes maritime zones of control: By this agreement, coastal 
states have extensive sovereignty rights in a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around their 
baselines and have natural resource exploitation rights within their 200-nautical-mile 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs).89 China’s reinterpretation of definitional standards and 
the historical claim it believes supersedes UN treaty lead China to make sweeping claims 
in the Sea. 
China’s claims are not the only excessive assertion of maritime control, but they 
are the broadest. The PRC’s interpretation of the UNCLOS incorporates excessive claims 
like expanded coastal baselines, demands for prior permission for foreign naval 
operations within its EEZ, and its broad and vaguely historical claim of sovereignty 
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within the Nine Dash Line. There is no clear consensus within China, however, about 
what those claims to sovereignty entail. In a 2009 letter to the UN Commission on Limits 
of the Continental Shelf, China wrote that 
China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea 
and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. The above 
position is consistently held by the Chinese Government and is widely 
known by the international community.90 
China’s statement and others like it leave unclear what those “adjacent” or 
“relevant” waters are and what sovereignty over them might mean. The language 
suggests neither appeal to nor a refutation of UNCLOS standardization. Other Chinese 
agencies publish ambiguous terms like “traditional boundary line,” “traditional maritime 
boundary,” or “historic rights that the PRC enjoys,” without clarification about what 
those lines, boundaries, and rights are.91 Despite China’s assertion of indisputability, 
there appears to be no clear internal consensus within the PRC about exactly what the 
Nine Dash Line means. 
On the South China Sea specifically, as well as on a broader set of issues, 
ASEAN’s diplomatic forum presents a challenge to China, which generally prefers to 
engage bilaterally with states much smaller than itself. In order to wield bilateral leverage 
against a multilateral institution, China exerts influence by proxy. Cambodia is China’s 
closest friend and most pliable client in ASEAN, and despite having no claim of its own 
in the South China Sea, Cambodia advocates for Chinese interests there. An example of 
Cambodia’s proxy advocacy was the role it played in a 2012 dispute between China and 
the Philippines. In April of that year, Chinese vessels at anchor near Scarborough Shoal 
entered a tense standoff with vessels from the Philippine Navy after refusing to consent to 
inspection and resisting subsequent arrest for poaching. The Philippines regarded 
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inspection as their privilege within what they claimed as their own EEZ; the Chinese 
vessels felt the same about their right to refuse arrest within the Nine Dash Line.92   
In July 2012, Cambodia hosted a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Phnom 
Penh. On the agenda was management of South China Sea tensions. Vietnam and the 
Philippines both moved to include mention of China’s claims in the South China Sea, 
China’s dispute with the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and the China-Philippines 
naval standoff in the meeting’s communiqué. In Carlyle Thayer’s detailed account of that 
meeting, he notes that Philippine Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario wanted to record 
the ministers’ discussion of “the situation in the Scarborough Shoal and… serious 
concern over such developments in the area, particularly those provisions in the 
UNCLOS related to Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves,” referring to 
claims to the shoal.93 Ministers from Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, and Singapore also 
recommended that the communiqué refer directly to South China Sea disputes.94 
Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, representing the Cambodian chair 
and tasked with drafting the joint communique, consistently rejected any mention of 
South China Seas disputes in general and the Scarborough Shoals standoff in particular.95 
Not only did the meeting not record the Philippines’ outrage, but for the first time in 
45 years of ministerial meetings, no communiqué was issued at all.96  
Thayer attributes the failure of the meeting to issue a communiqué to the chair’s 
apparently obstinate refusal to print one.97 Hor Namhong argued that it was not 
ASEAN’s place to arbitrate a bilateral dispute, that there was no consensus on the 
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subject, and that no communiqué ought to be issued without consensus.98 However, 
Cambodia was apparently the only vocal dissent. With no South China Sea maritime 
claims of its own, why would Cambodia choose this issue as a reason to scuttle its 
own meeting?  
Chinese foreign aid and investment preceded Cambodia’s advocacy of Chinese 
interests. Chinese aid dominated Cambodia’s aid receipts in the several years prior to 
Phnom Penh’s ASEAN summit. Between 1997 and 2012, China extended some 
$10 billion in aid and investment to Cambodia, which nearly matched the $12 billion 
Cambodia received from all other donors during that time.99 In 2011 alone, China 
provided $1.9 billion in aid and investment, including a $39.6 million grant and 
$31.7 million concessional loan.100 In comparison, Japan, Cambodia’s largest individual 
donor in the OECD, contributed between $116 and $139 million per year at the time.101  
In April 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao each made 
visits to Phnom Penh, and each meeting led to new trade agreements. That September, 
after that summer’s ASEAN conventions, China extended $523 million in loans and 
grants to Cambodia, explicitly to maintain “friendly relations with ASEAN.”102 Further, 
in the days after the ministerial meeting in Phnom Penh, Xinhua quoted Chinese Foreign 
Minister Yang Jiechi as thanking Cambodia’s prime minister for “supporting China’s 
core interests.”103 Cambodian Ministry of Economy official Aun Porn Moniroth 
celebrated that “the Chinese government also voiced high appreciation for the part played 
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by Cambodia as the chair of ASEAN to maintain good cooperation between China and 
ASEAN.”104 
In summary, by delivering decades of generous foreign aid, China appears to have 
exerted influence on ASEAN through Cambodia to support China’s interests in the South 
China Sea. Cambodia, whose position as chair in 2012 permitted it to prevent 2012’s 
joint communiqué, was widely criticized, in Asia and elsewhere, as being subservient to 
China’s interests.105  
D. PURSUIT OF DEVELOPMENT ON THE MEKONG RIVER  
The Mekong River originates in the mountains of Yunnan Province, China, and 
flows south past Myanmar, between Thailand and Laos, through Cambodia, and into the 
Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. The river is an enormously valuable resource along 
its entire length: In the north, deep gorges make valuable sites for hydroelectric dams, 
while downstream, the Mekong supports irrigation for a population of some 60 million 
people.106 In Cambodia, the Mekong feeds Tonle Sap, the largest lake in Southeast Asia 
and the single largest source of protein for the Cambodian population.107  
As they do everywhere else in the world, infrastructure development and 
ecological preservation find themselves at loggerheads. On the one hand, a region 
growing in both population and in economic strength has an insatiable appetite for 
energy.108 Hydroelectric power is set to become a major source of energy in the Mekong 
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Basin, which is dotted with dozens of potential dam sites for hydroelectric and irrigation 
services. China’s stretch of the Mekong already has a half a dozen major hydroelectric 
dams. China, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia are planning to build dozens more along the 
lower length of the river.109 On the other hand, dammed rivers suffer in a variety of ways. 
In Cambodia, in particular, hydroelectric projects upstream have substantial negative 
effects on the critical annual flood that feeds Tonle Sap, the quality of the lake’s water, 
the supply of sediments and nutrients that feed the Cambodian basin ecosystem, and the 
health of migratory fish on which Cambodia’s impoverished population depends.110  
Phnom Penh is aware of the development-ecology tradeoff. In February 2003, 
Prime Minister Hun Sen spoke with alarm about Chinese dams on the Mekong and the 
possibility of damage to Tonle Sap and its fisheries. At a time when China was the only 
state building dams on the Mekong, Hun Sen said “the upstream countries’ projects in the 
Mekong River, namely the continued dam construction… have become a major concern 
for downstream countries including Cambodia.”111 In 2007, Phnom Penh also established 
the Tonle Sap Basin Authority, a domestic bureau charged with monitoring lake activity. 
In 2012, one of Cambodia’s official protests halted the construction of Xayaburi Dam, a 
Thai-owned dam in Laos, arguing for further study of its impact to river health.112 
Cambodia is demonstrably willing to challenge other states on their obstructions of the 
Mekong. Does Cambodia object to Chinese and Southeast Asian dams consistently? 
                                                 
109 “The Proliferation of Dams along the Mekong River,” The Economist, 16 February 2016, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/daily-chart-11; Carl Middleton, et al., “Old and 
New Hydropower Players in the Mekong Region: Agendas and Strategies,” in Contested Waterscapes,  
26–41. 
110 Sarkkula et al., “Hydropower in the Mekong Region,” 233–34; Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive,  
164–65. 
111 Milton Osborne, The Mekong: River Under Threat (New South Wales: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2009), 40. 
112 Zakariya Tin, “Cambodia Warns Laos Over Mekong Dam,” Radio Free Asia, 25 April 2012, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/dam-04192012143244.html; “Laos Halts Xayaburi Dam 
Work,” Asia Times, 11 May 2012, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NE11Ae02.html.  
 35
China’s interest in hydroelectric development along the Mekong is threefold: 
First, dams serve China’s own energy needs in Yunnan. Second, dam projects are an 
attractive business opportunity for Chinese engineering and construction firms operating 
both domestically and abroad.113 Third, China has a genuine interest in economic 
development and prosperity in Southeast Asia, which presents a rapidly growing set of 
trading partners.114 Thus, China’s interest in Mekong River development is an 
intersection of the realist pursuit of resources and the liberal goal of economic 
interdependence and cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia all have similar developmental and 
economic interests in hydroelectric development. The difference between China and its 
partner nations is the enormous diplomatic and economic pressure it can exert in order to 
support its own projects. Foreign aid is one element of that pressure. Chinese aid to 
Cambodia slowed in the 1990s, but increased substantially around 2002, beginning with 
the forgiveness of $200 million of Cambodian debt. Between 2002 and 2014, China 
extended some $22.7 billion in investment capital, loans, and grants to Cambodia, 
including an $11.2 billion investment announcement in 2013 for Chinese mining and 
railway investments there.115 Compared to the $8.6 billion in OECD aid during that 
period, Chinese financing was, by a wide margin, Cambodia’s largest single revenue 
source.116 OECD ODA to Cambodia is summarized in Figure 1. 
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 OECD Annual ODA to Cambodia, 1960–2015.117 Figure 1. 
Some of that aid may have directly addressed Mekong development: Joshua 
Kurlantzick writes about the particular relationship China shares with its Mekong 
neighbors, whose objections to development projects have been placated by Chinese 
pressure or largesse. “Every time Cambodians complain privately to the Chinese about 
the Mekong River,” Kurlantzick writes, “a Chinese delegation visits countries in 
Southeast Asia, offers promises of aid, emphasizes how popular China has become, and 
makes promises to uphold environmental standards.”118 
Since 2003, the Cambodian government has offered no further objections to 
Chinese dams. In a 2010 press event, Hun Sen deflected the environmental impacts of 
Upper Mekong dam projects. “Don’t be too extreme of an environmentalist,” he warned 
reporters, “and don’t say that because of the hydroelectricity there is no water in the 
lower part of the Mekong. That would be a mistake.”119  
In addition to aid-bought influence, Cambodia also acts in self-interest toward 
dams from which it will benefit, even at ecological expense. The Don Sahong Dam, 
under construction by Malaysian firm Mega First Corporation Berhad, lies just inside 
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Laos on the Laos-Cambodia border. Don Sahong would provide 256 megawatts of power 
to Laos and Cambodia. In 2015, Hun Sen dismissed the possibility of the Don Sahong 
Dam’s construction as being too environmentally harmful.120 In 2016, in an about face 
that he has not explained to the public, Hun Sen extended his support to the dam.121 
Cambodia’s resistance to the Xayaburi Dam (which, north of Thailand, will yield no 
benefit to Cambodia) but endorsement of dams in China and on the Cambodian border, 
suggest Phnom Penh’s acquiescence to hydroelectric development is for sale: in the 
former case, for Chinese aid, and in the latter, for inexpensive Laotian electricity. 
China declines to join the Mekong River Commission (MRC), an organization 
whose major responsibility is to coordinate the river’s development and mediate disputes. 
Instead, China prefers to engage bilaterally, where it can focus its diplomatic weight on a 
single small neighbor rather than a balancing coalition. China’s use of foreign aid and 
absence from the MRC echoes China’s approach to ASEAN and its preference to act 
through bilateral negotiation. 
In summary, Chinese aid appears to soften Cambodian resistance to Mekong 
dams. Hun Sen was once a vocal advocate for Mekong and Tonle Sap environmental 
health. Just after the turn of the century, at about the same time Chinese aid to Cambodia 
dramatically increased, Hun Sen changed his rhetoric to support Chinese Mekong 
hydroelectric projects and denied their negative environmental impact. His support is not 
limited to Chinese dams, but also extends to the Dan Sahong Dam, a potential source 
of electricity for rural Cambodia. On the other hand, Cambodia continues to protest 
the more distant Malaysian-owned Xayaburi Dam, hundreds of miles upriver on the 
Laos-Thai border. Thus, Hun Sen’s interest appears to include the prospect of 
inexpensive Laotian hydroelectric power as well as continued Chinese foreign aid. 
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From Beijing’s perspective, Phnom Penh’s support for Chinese dams appears to be one 
objective of Chinese aid.  
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that China’s interests in Cambodia are a 
microcosm of its national interests writ large. China’s inaugural attempt to buy support 
for the One China Policy was in Cambodia, and Cambodia was a major theater of China’s 
bitter feuds with the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Since Mao’s death, Cambodia has been 
involved in China’s development of regional power as a beneficiary of largesse, a 
proponent of China’s maritime claims, and a victim of ecological harm. At every point, 
China has successfully employed foreign aid as a tool for pursuing its interests in 
Cambodia. China’s aid projects and the major foreign policy campaigns they have 
supported are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Chinese Aid and FDI in Cambodia, 1956–2014 
 
Sources: All data derived from Copper, China’s Foreign Aid and Copper, China’s Foreign Aid 
and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. II unless otherwise noted. 
* Bartke, China’s Economic Aid, 96. 
† Richardson, China, Cambodia and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 87. 
‡ Michael Vatikiotis, “A Too-Friendly Embrace,” Far Eastern Economic Review 167, no. 24 
(2004): 21. 
§ Kheang, “Cambodia in 2012,” 148. 
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III. CHINA’S AID IN KENYA 
The PRC and the Republic of Kenya established diplomatic relations in 1963, 
marking the beginning of a turbulent bilateral relationship. What dynamics have guided 
China’s relationship with Kenya, and what benefits has China derived from its aid 
program there? This chapter outlines relevant events in Chinese political history, China’s 
history of economic engagement in Kenya, and the current state of Sino-Kenyan affairs.  
In outlining this relationship, this chapter also considers criticism leveled at China 
for its political interference, resource exploitation, and unfair labor practices. To what 
extent does Kenya’s case support or contradict that criticism?  
The Sino-Kenyan relationship has been volatile, as the analytical narrative of this 
chapter shows. Mao Zedong’s communist ideology opened Sino-Kenyan diplomacy and 
the split between Jaramogi Oginga Odinga’s and Jomo Kenyatta’s nearly ended it. Deng 
Xiaoping’s and Daniel arap Moi’s national transitions to prioritizing development saved 
it, leading to a beneficial but imperfect trade and investment relationship. However, both 
during the Cold War and in the modern era, China has gained little from its engagement 
in Kenya: China’s Cold War efforts failed, and while its modern aid, trade, and 
investment are small but growing, they have resulted in little political payoff. Kenya now 
offers a case of Chinese economic engagement with little evidence of a natural resource 
grab or quid pro quo political influence. 
A. AID IN THE 1960S: ONE CHINA, REVOLUTION, AND COLD WAR 
POLITICS 
In the 1960s, China devoted a great deal of attention and aid to Africa. China had 
several goals: among them, the isolation of Taiwan, support for national revolutions, and 
competition with the Soviet Union and West for influence. 
Kenya was one of China’s first aid recipients in Africa. The 1960s saw 
widespread African emancipation from European empires, including Kenya’s 
independence in 1963. Once independent, Kenya almost immediately established 
diplomatic ties with China. In May 1964, Beijing offered Nairobi a $2.8 million cash 
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grant and a $15 million interest-free loan.122 This aid was consistent with other Chinese 
aid to African states: Central African Republic, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the Republic of 
Congo also established relations with China at about the same time, and were rewarded 
with some $47 million in aid in total.123 
Analysts differ about the motivation behind China’s original round of aid. 
Wolfgang Bartke and John Copper draw a direct line between Kenya’s diplomatic 
recognition of China and the aid China extended in apparent gratitude a few months 
later.124 In contrast, African politics historian Charles Hornsby argues China’s aid was 
support for socialist revolution. In his survey of Kenyan history, Hornsby notes that 
Kenyan Vice President and outspoken leftist Jaramogi Oginga Odinga traveled to Beijing 
in May 1964. There he gave a speech that supported communist revolution in Africa, 
after which Beijing extended its $17.8 million in aid as well as offering a promise of 
Chinese military assistance.125 In either case, China’s aid appeared to have a basis in 
China’s kinship either to Kenya as a non-aligned state or as a potential communist ally. 
Some of Beijing’s intentions can be inferred from its activities in other areas of 
policy throughout Africa. Elsewhere in Africa, Beijing’s aid supported communist 
revolutions within individual states. Chinese communist ideology supported socialist 
revolution wherever the proletariat appeared ready to revolt, including African 
rebellions.126 One PLA statement at the time celebrated that “the embryo of national 
revolution in these [African] countries will become a genuine people’s revolution, give 
rise to Marxists, form political parties of proletariats and go toward the Socialist 
Revolution.”127 China devoted military assistance to communist revolutionary elements 
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in a half a dozen African states.128 Two of those cases, Congo and Somalia, relate to 
Kenya’s case. In the case of Congo, Chinese aid to Kenya helped China’s shipments of 
arms reach land-locked Congolese revolutionaries. In the case of Somalia, aid to Kenya 
may have eased Kenya’s fears about Beijing’s military aid to Somalia’s communist 
regime, with which Kenya had ongoing and occasionally violent tension.129 Thus, Africa 
in the 1960s was a complex patchwork of revolutionary movements. In Kenya itself, 
China offered assistance to leftist elements but failed two challenges, discussed further 
below: Financially, China was outspent by its rivals, and ideologically, Kenya’s 
ascendant right-wing faction rejected communist influence and support. 
Amid the many mid-century African revolutions, aid was a tool of Cold War great 
power competition in Africa. During the Cold War and after the Sino-Soviet Split, the 
West, the Soviet Union, and China competed for influence in Africa. China framed this 
competition as being between U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism against a united 
front of national liberation movements.130 One Beijing Review article from 1970 decried 
both the United States’ “frenzied efforts to obstruct the armed struggle of the African 
people” and Soviet guidance to African peoples to “sit and wait for the elimination of 
colonialism through the United Nations.”131 Aid supported China’s influence among 
African leftist revolutionaries as they fought both West-affiliated right-wing 
governments, as in Congo, and Soviet-affiliated leftist movements, as in Angola and 
Zimbabwe.132  
In terms of larger Cold War politics, China was at a substantial disadvantage and 
its foreign aid had mixed results. Chinese foreign aid to Kenya paled in comparison to aid 
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it received from other powers: At approximately the same time that China extended its 
$17.8 million offer to Kenya, the Soviet Union offered $44 million. The United 
Kingdom, still engaged in Kenya as a former colonial power, sent $300 million to Kenya 
in 1963 after Kenya’s independence.133 China could not outspend its competitors. 
Because of the overwhelming presence of aid from other sources, Chinese aid not only 
had limited effect because of the crowded aid environment—Kenya may never have 
drawn money at all from China’s loan.134 
Ultimately, Chinese aid to Kenya in the 1960s accomplished little. Aid may have 
helped solidify Kenya’s diplomatic recognition of China, but other objectives remained 
unmet. Beijing may have intended aid to inspire Kenyan support in advance of the 
Second Afro-Asian Conference, scheduled for 1965, but that conference never 
occurred.135 Communist political elements in Kenya never established a firm base of 
power. China’s shipments of weapons through Kenya to Congo had little effect: Mobutu 
Sese Seko’s regime assumed power in 1965 and established ties to the West, despite 
Chinese arms that flowed through Kenya to Congolese leftist rebels.136 Most tellingly, 
aid to Kenya failed to create a mutually beneficial bilateral relationship. Kenya soon 
entirely ceased cooperation with China, despite China’s offers of aid. 
B. FREEZE AND THAW, 1965–80 
In addition to being outspent by the United Kingdom, China also lost an 
ideological battle in Kenya. China and Kenya had scarcely traded diplomats in 1963 
before their relationship went sour. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), the 
ruling party at the time, had split into left- and right-wing factions. The left wing of 
KANU, led by Vice President Oginga Odinga, tried to build national enthusiasm for 
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Chinese revolutionary thought.137 The right, led by President Jomo Kenyatta with British 
support, bristled at revolutionary comparisons: Chinese statesman Zhou Enlai’s praise in 
1964 of Africa’s “excellent revolutionary situation” was anathema to Kenyatta, who had 
already waged his revolution some ten years prior to Zhou’s visit.138  
More than being an advocate for Kenyan socialism, Odinga also actively sought 
both Soviet and Chinese assistance. In April 1965, a Soviet freighter loaded with small 
arms and heavy weapons docked at Mombasa. In a tense standoff, Kenyatta and his 
British confederates inspected and turned away this shipment, apparently with the 
suspicion that the weapons’ customers would ultimately be communist separatists in 
Odinga’s political camp.139 The same year, the government made a separate discovery of 
Chinese weapons in the hands of Kenyan dissidents.140 The British suspected that Odinga 
also received some $150,000 of Chinese funding to support leftist activities in 1965.141 
Kenyatta and his right wing created enough resistance to leftist opposition within 
KANU to discredit Odinga and derail Sino-Kenyan relations for a decade. Kenya and 
China lodged protests against each other as Kenya expelled Chinese diplomats and 
journalists (along with their Soviet counterparts). Formal diplomatic ties remained in 
place, but the dyad exchanged no delegations whatsoever between 1965 and 1970, and 
the 1970s saw very little interaction between the two countries.142 “Before Chinese 
economic aid had really begun,” Wolfgang Bartke writes, “it became bogged down in an 
atmosphere of distrust” that lasted until 1980.143 Kenya’s right wing did not only reject 
                                                 
137 Michael Chege, “Economic Relations Between Kenya and China, 1963–2007,” in U.S. and 
Chinese Engagement in Africa, ed. Jennifer Cooke (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, July 2008), 15. 
138 Ibid., 16. 
139 Hornsby, Kenya, 151. 
140 Bartke, China’s Economic Aid, 125. 
141 Hornsby, Kenya, 158. 
142 Hornsby, Kenya, 177–78. 
143 Ibid., 125. 
 46
Chinese support: It also rejected the Soviet Union, to which Kenyatta turned a cold 
shoulder for decades.144 
The thawing of Sino-Kenyan relations in the 1980s correlates with leadership 
changes in both countries. In China, Mao died in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping became 
China’s de facto leader in 1978 (although he never held office as head of state himself). 
Also in 1978, Daniel arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta as Kenya’s president. Despite Moi’s 
outspoken opposition to communist influence, he had much less enmity toward 
communism than had his predecessor. China, too, was a much different communist 
power under Deng. Deng and Moi were both pragmatic statesmen: the former with 
respect to damping the ideological insanity of the Cultural Revolution, and the latter with 
respect to inviting foreign support for Kenyan infrastructure and industrial projects.145 
Leadership visits in the 1980s suggest considerable easing of tensions. In 1980, 
Moi visited Beijing, and in 1983, State Council Premier Zhao Ziyang visited Nairobi. A 
slow cascade of confidence-building measures, friendship communiques, and leadership 
visits ensued, followed by renewed trade and economic engagement.146 High-level state 
visits led to a treaty in which China offered aid in the form of educational and technical 
assistance as well as a Chinese-built stadium in Nairobi. Moi visited Beijing again in 
1988.147 Trade was slower to respond to political change, but in 1993, bilateral trade 
began sharply to increase. 
C. CHINA’S ECONOMIC STATECRAFT IN MODERN KENYA 
Today, China’s interactions with Kenya are chiefly commercial rather than 
ideological. Beijing’s aid commitments during Mao’s tenure had transparent political or 
ideological motives. What motives might have driven China’s economic engagement in 
                                                 
144 “Weekly Summary Special Report: Soviet Policy in Africa South of the Sahara,” Central 
Intelligence Agency, 28 February 1969, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-
00927A006900050003-1.pdf, 7; Paul Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (Basingstoke, UK: 
Macmillan, 1991), 128. 
145 Chege, “Economic Relations,” 17; Joseph Onjala, “The Impact of China-Africa Trade Relations: 
The Case of Kenya,” AERC Collaborative Research China-Africa Project 5 (November 2010), 2. 
146 Chege, “Economic Relations,” 16. 
147 Hornsby, Kenya, 371, 418. 
 47
Kenya after tensions eased? What criticism has Beijing drawn from analysts suspicious of 
China’s activity, and is that criticism warranted? Because aid alone renders an incomplete 
picture of China’s economic engagement in Kenya, the following sections cover aid, 
trade, and investment as avenues of China’s economic statecraft. These sections also 
discuss trade and investment practices that critics have unfairly described as being unjust. 
1. Aid 
With the exception of a single $108 million grant for Nairobi road construction in 
2000, aid from China had a low volume until 2005, and then expanded rapidly (see 
Table 3 at the end of this chapter). In 2002 and 2003, China delivered $6.7 million and 
$6.2 million of aid, respectively. In 2005, that figure jumped to $175 million.148 Chinese 
aid activity jumped again in 2013 with China’s engagement in Kenya’s standard gauge 
railway, which received 90 percent of its $3.6 billion funding in a loan from China’s 
EXIM Bank.149 Aid to Kenya follows the same guidelines that China applies elsewhere: 
Aid disbursements are almost entirely project-based, rather than being fungible budgetary 
assistance to a given level of government.150 When selecting projects to fund, China 
generally follows Kenyan demand signals. Those projects have included road 
construction, utilities infrastructure development, and technical training missions.151 
Aside from the mechanism of financing (that is, concessional loans and grants vs. 
investment activity), aid and investment appear to follow similar guidelines and have 
similar benefits to the host country. 
2. Trade 
China represents a small but growing segment of Kenya’s trade and a driver of 
Kenya’s overall trade imbalance. In absolute terms, Kenya’s imports from China grew 
from some $26 million in 1992 to $2.1 billion in 2006; most of that growth came in the 
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twenty-first century. In that same period, Kenya’s exports to China grew from almost 
nothing to around $49 million.152 That growth suggests enormous expansion of Sino-
Kenyan trade, but Chinese trade is still a relatively small part of Kenya’s overall activity. 
Between 1979 and 1994, Kenya’s exports to China averaged 0.43 percent of Kenya’s 
overall exports. That proportion grew slightly to 0.63 percent between 1995 and 2004. 
Kenya’s imports from China doubled from 1.42 percent to 2.85 percent in the same 
periods—a growing share, but still not a large portion of Kenya’s overall trade. These 
trends, summarized in Figure 2, indicate a growing bilateral trade relationship and 
growing trade surplus for China.153  
 
 Sino-Kenyan Trade (1992–2013)154 Figure 2. 
China’s trade surplus with Kenya may not be a deliberate goal of China’s trade 
strategy. In a white paper published in 2011, the Information Office of the State Council 
of China acknowledges that China’s strength in manufacturing results in strong consumer 
and industrial goods sales and an overall trade surplus. This trade surplus has negative 
unintended consequences that pose challenges for Beijing’s trade policy. Trade surplus in 
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manufactured goods leads to “more trade frictions between China and its trading partners, 
as well as persistent pressure on the Renmenbi to appreciate.”155 The State Council has 
implemented measures to promote balanced trade and “curb overheated surplus growth,” 
including expanding domestic demand, encouraging imports through tax incentives, and 
switching from a pegged currency to a managed floating Renmenbi.156 China has also 
taken specific measures to improve its trade balance with Kenya. In 2006, during their 
bilateral Economic and Trade Committee meeting, each party discussed paths to 
equitable trade. China also established a fund encouraging imports of basic Kenyan 
goods like coffee beans, sisal (a commodity fiber), and tea.157 By implementing reforms 
to temper its trade surplus of manufactured goods, Beijing hopes to ameliorate frictions 
with its trading partners and maintain macroeconomic control over its currency.158  
For Kenya’s part, analysts disagree on whether there is a negative effect on Kenya 
from its trade deficit with China. Joseph Onjala notes the import/export patterns above 
with alarm. The bulk of Kenya’s trade is with the European Union (EU), whereas trade 
with China and with the United States is a smaller segment of Kenya’s trade (see 
Figure 3).159 However, Onjala argues that the trajectory of Sino-Kenyan trade indicates 
China’s increasing importance as a trade partner and determiner of Kenyan economic 
health. The rapidly increasing trade imbalance will continue to favor China.160 As the 
figure also illustrates, as Kenya has become more trade-dependent on China, it has 
reduced its trade dependence on the EU and U.S. since about 2000. 
                                                 
155 “China’s Foreign Trade,” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 
December 2011, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043184.htm.  
156 Ibid. 
157 Joseph Onjala, “China’s Comparative Trade, Aid and Investment Behavior in Kenya vis-à-vis 
India and the European Union (EU),” in Strengthening the Civil Society Perspective: China’s African 
Impact, ed. Stephen Marks (2009), 84–85. 
158 “China’s Foreign Trade.” 
159 Ibid. 
160 Onjala, Scoping Study, 26–29. 
 50
 
On the left axis, Kenya’s trade volume (imports plus exports) with the EU, China, and 
the United States. On the right, the percentage of Kenyan trade done with the EU, 
China, and the United States. European and U.S. shares of Kenyan trade have declined, 
while Chinese trade began small but has climbed since 2004. 
 Kenyan Trade Volume (China, EU, U.S.) and Shares of Kenyan Figure 3. 
Trade, 1997–2003161 
Echoing Robert Solow’s quip that “I have a chronic deficit with my barber, who 
doesn’t buy a darned thing from me,”162 Apurva Sanghi and Dylan Johnson temper their 
alarm by noting that bilateral trade is not representative of the health of a national 
economy—the overall trade balance is what matters. Kenya does have a net overall trade 
deficit, but Sanghi and Johnson argue that a bilateral deficit need not damn a particular 
bilateral trade relationship. The Sino-Kenyan trade balance is a small element of Kenya’s 
broader trade problem, not a unique cause of it.163 Further, they argue that Kenya’s 
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for example, benefit Kenyan consumers and resellers, even while they stifle Kenya’s 
domestic textile and clothing industries (which account for a fifth of Kenya’s formal 
employment).164 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
Chinese investment is another major facet of the Sino-Kenyan economic 
relationship. Kenya actively seeks FDI. Measures to increase FDI include Kenya’s 
investment deregulation in 1995, prior to which FDI required Central Bank of Kenya 
approval, and the Investment Promotion Act of 2004, which reduced limits on foreign 
ownership of Kenyan businesses.165 Prior to 2000, China invested almost nothing in 
Kenya. Between 2000 and 2005, Chinese FDI to Kenya amounted to $32 million, which 
represented 7.2 percent of Kenya’s $446 million in total FDI in that period. For the most 
part, China’s FDI came through Chinese state-owned manufacturing enterprises.166 The 
acceleration of China’s FDI in Kenya is consistent with its investment activity 
worldwide: The total volume of China’s investments was low until the turn of the twenty-
first century, when Beijing began translating its domestic economic success into 
international investment.167 
China does not appear to benefit disproportionately from the labor employed at 
Kenyan projects. Rather than employing expatriate Chinese laborers, Chinese projects 
have almost entirely used local labor. Between 2000 and 2006, for example, nearly 5,000 
of the 5,300 jobs generated by Chinese projects in Kenya went to Kenyans.168 Despite a 
high proportion of local employment, Chinese FDI in Africa has endured criticism for 
“sending hordes of their own laborers,” as Deborah Brautigam notes, to staff Chinese 
projects.169 China’s labor export record in Africa is mixed, but China has generally only 
                                                 
164 Ibid., 10–11. 
165 Onjala, Scoping Study, 11. 
166 Ibid., 12–14. 
167 Wolf et al., China’s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities, 19. 
168 Onjala, Scoping Study, 14–19.  
169 “Diplomacy Through Aid,” Time Magazine, October 18, 1968, quoted in Deborah Brautigam, The 
Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University, 2009), 154. 
 52
shipped its own labor forces when faced with a lack of skilled labor. In post-civil war 
Angola, for example, Chinese firms employed some eight Chinese laborers for every 
Angolan. However, China’s reputation for shipping its own labor is increasingly 
undeserved as China finds more skilled labor in situ (and as, in some cases, African states 
begin to require local employment as a condition of foreign investment).170 
Resource exploration is another major driver of Chinese investment in sub-
Saharan Africa (and of criticism thereof). Along with labor practices, Chinese investment 
raises international concerns about resource grabs.171 China’s energy requirements are 
growing rapidly, and so might its motivation to secure resources abroad.172 As one World 
Bank report noted, “most Chinese government funded projects in sub-Saharan Africa are 
ultimately aimed at securing a flow of sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources for export 
to China.”173 David Brown argues that China’s aid and investment priorities have shifted 
from politics to energy and market access, beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s assumption 
of national power in 1978 and continuing with China’s transition to net oil importer in 
1995 and admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001.174 In some cases, natural 
resource access is an integral part of Chinese engagement. Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea repaid EXIM Bank loans with oil.175 Loan 
repayment is not limited to oil: Ghana repaid a loan for hydroelectric infrastructure with 
cocoa bean exports, and Tanzania did the same with cashew nuts, illustrating China’s 
willingness to secure loans with non-strategic resources.176 Furthermore, the infrastructure 
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projects in which China invests capital, including those backed by resources, are diverse. 
Some, like a proposed railway and port for Gabon’s iron ore, support the export of natural 
resources to China. Many others do not: Railroads in Angola do not support the extraction 
of its offshore oil, nor do hospitals help move Congolese ore.177  
In addition to resource and market access, and despite China’s shift from ideology 
to entrepreneurship, the isolation of Taiwan remains a key factor in Chinese investments 
allocation in Africa. Brautigam argues that China devotes aid and FDI to every 
sub-Saharan state with which it has diplomatic relations, whether resource-rich or -poor. 
Burkina Faso, Swaziland, and until 2008, Malawi were the only sub-Saharan states to 
recognize the Republic of China and were the only ones that did not receive aid of any 
kind from the PRC. African support of the PRC’s One China Policy remains a key 
determiner of Chinese aid and investment.178  
In Kenya, resource exploration and exploitation does not motivate Chinese 
investment. Kenya is resource poor. It does not export oil or gas and has no major 
mineral deposits. What rents it does collect from natural resources come from forestry 
rents and have accounted for only 3 percent to 5 percent of GDP for the past two 
decades.179 Kenya’s potential as an oil producer garnered international attention in the 
2000s, including from twelve Western oil firms, but exploration by state-owned 
enterprise China National Offshore Oil Corporation between 2006 and 2010 resulted in 
inconclusive results and no further Chinese exploration.180 
As in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, China’s investment activity in Kenya is 
diverse and project-based. Sanghi and Johnson note the range of Chinese investment 
interests there, where “manufacturing and service sectors attract a number of small and 
medium enterprises, and construction draws larger companies.”181 Recent large-scale 
projects conducted by Chinese firms include road construction ($27.1 million by China 
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Wu Yi Co.), 378 miles of standard gauge railway between Nairobi and Mombasa 
($3.6 billion by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, funded largely by a loan from 
EXIM Bank), and port improvements at Lamu Island ($467 million by the China 
Communications Construction Company).182 Chinese state-owned enterprises hold 
contracts to work on those large projects, but small firms also operate in Kenya: Some 
400 Chinese companies, many of which are privately owned, conduct business in Kenya’s 
communications, automotive parts manufacturing, and hospitality service sectors.183  
In sum, China has a diverse portfolio of project-based investment and business 
activity in Kenya. Evidence, including Kenya’s poor natural resource endowment and 
large degree of local labor employment at Chinese projects, suggests criticism of resource 
exploitation and parasitic labor practices are unfounded in this case. 
D. CONCLUSION 
What has China gotten from its aid to Kenya? Not very much. Particularly in the 
1960s, Kenya was a minor but stark failure of Chinese foreign policy. In the modern era, 
Kenya is a small but growing partner for Chinese trade and investment.  
What else can China’s engagement in Kenya tell us about Chinese foreign policy? 
China’s relationship with Kenya illustrates a key inflection point in Chinese political 
history: The shift from the Maoist ideology of the 1950s through 1970s to the reform and 
opening up of the 1980s through the present. Before the 1980s, Chinese aid generally 
promoted international kinship, whether by support for peaceful nonalignment or for 
violent nationalist revolution. Thereafter, once Deng’s economic reforms became one of 
the Middle Kingdom’s new guiding principles, Chinese aid, investment, and trade appear 
to promote economic gain. Kenya presents a clear case of this shift for two reasons. First, 
the diplomatic breakdown between 1965 and 1980 makes the distinction between Chinese 
strategies more clear than would a continuously evolving relationship. Second, the Sino-
Kenyan relationship is unencumbered by a number of complicating factors that would 
make analysis more ambiguous: There is little evidence of a resource grab narrative, 
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regional hegemony aspirations, or patron-client expectations, any of which would have 
made China’s engagement there less clearly a case of win-win economic exchange.  
In short, Kenya’s case contains within itself its own comparison over time: China 
once treated Kenya as a political battleground and now treats it as a trading partner. In 
international relations terms, China engaged with Cold War Kenya as a venue for realist 
great power competition, but now engages with modern Kenya in the spirit of 
interdependence, mutual economic benefit, and cooperation. 
As with any comparative case, Cold War Kenya and modern Kenya also have 
similarities. As African states emerged from colonialism, China interacted with all of 
them. That multitude of relationships meant China’s efforts in Africa were being pulled 
in 54 slightly different directions. Neither in the Cold War nor in the modern period was 
Kenya a decisive battleground for China’s African engagement. That means China could 
afford to be outspent, and outspent it was: Kenya received much more support from the 
West and from the Soviet Union while China attempted to gather Cold War friends. 
Today, China’s economic engagement with Kenya is small, and is still dwarfed by 
regional and EU trade, other states’ FDI, and Western ODA.184  
In conclusion, mutual economic benefit appears to underpin China’s foreign 
policy in Kenya today, with little apparent evidence of major transgressions of 
sovereignty in the modern era. Under Mao, every Chinese effort had ideological 
meaning: The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution at home, along with 
evangelism for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and non-aligned solidarity 
abroad, supported revolutionary ideals. Under Deng, ideology gave way to pragmatism, 
and investment and trade joined grant aid in Beijing’s foreign policy toolbox. Initially, 
Kenya had a mixed response to China’s overtures; Kenyatta’s suspicion dominated 
Oginga Odinga’s communist enthusiasm. Sino-Kenyan relations remained frozen until 
Moi thawed them, opening the door for foreign investment. Trade and investment 
increased, for better or for worse. Modern China, whose only outright demand is support 
for the PRC’s legitimacy in One China, appears to avoid extensive political intervention 
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and focuses on the economic merits of its engagement in Kenya. Major projects funded 
by Chinese aid and FDI are summarized in Table 3. The OECD’s contributions of ODA 
to Kenya are shown in Figure 4. 
Table 3.   Chinese Aid and FDI in Kenya, 1964–2013185 
 
 
 OECD Annual ODA to Kenya, 1960–2015186 Figure 4. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined China’s engagement with Cambodia and with Kenya 
since the founding of the People’s Republic. In Cambodia, China has a rich history of 
political influence: There, China has built international political recognition while 
isolating Taiwan, challenged Soviet encirclement and Vietnamese expansion, supported 
communist revolution, pursued massive infrastructure projects, and rallied support for its 
contentious maritime claims. In pursuing each of these interests, China has used aid and 
investment as tools of economic statecraft. China’s engagement in Kenya also began with 
aggressive pursuit of narrow interests, but since the 1980s, Sino-Kenyan relations have 
been decidedly more arms-length. China has extended aid, investment, and trade deals to 
Kenya with little evidence of the direct political manipulation one sees in Cambodia.  
The first section of this chapter introduces the U.S. national interests that China’s 
economic statecraft may challenge. Nowhere does the United States fully, explicitly 
delineate its national interests, nor do political analysts agree on what they might be. 
To evaluate the potential challenge presented by Chinese economic statecraft, this chapter 
considers both realist and liberal formulations of U.S. interest and draw conclusions 
based on each. The realist might be alarmed at both political influence in Cambodia and 
enrichment in Kenya, whereas the liberal might decry Chinese degradation of liberal 
institutions in Cambodia but be hopeful at economic interdependence with Kenya.  
Both realist and liberal formulations of U.S. national interest validate the 
hypotheses that Chinese foreign aid and investment have, in at least one case, bought 
political influence and that this engagement presents a substantial challenge for the 
United States to address, although the two national interest formulations presented lead to 
very different characterizations of that challenge. The second section of this chapter 
evaluates this thesis’s hypotheses.  
The third section of this chapter suggests avenues for further research, including 
the expansion of cases to determine whether China is predominantly intrusive or 
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conservative, the characterization of whether China is a regional or a global power, the 
economic considerations of aid recipients, the degree to which Chinese aid and 
investment chase natural resources, and the extent of Kenya’s involvement in One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR). 
A. THREAT TO U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST 
In Chapters II and III, this thesis explored the interests China pursues in 
Cambodia and Kenya with foreign aid. Does Chinese economic statecraft challenge U.S. 
interests? This section constructs U.S. national interests from the perspective of realism, 
which holds that states defend their interests in an anarchic system, and liberalism, which 
holds that institutions, international organizations, and economic engagement can 
moderate state interaction. This section then argues that realist analysis finds much more 
to fear in Chinese economic statecraft than liberal analysis does.  
1. Formulation of U.S. National Interest: Realism 
To define U.S. national interest in realist terms, President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
approach is seminal. “No other president,” writes Henry Kissinger in his comparison of 
Roosevelt and Wilson, “defined America’s world role so completely in terms of national 
interest, or identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of 
power.”187 Roosevelt dismissed international organizations, institutions, and treaties as 
“scraps of paper without any backing in efficient force” in an anarchic world.188 Instead, 
he believed that the balance of power was the key driver of international relations. He 
also believed power conferred justice in a state’s control of its sphere of influence, as 
with his defense of the Monroe Doctrine189 as well as his acceptance of Japan’s 
occupation of Korea in 1908.190 His chief criterion for intervening in other states’ 
conflicts was not injustice but the threat of upsetting the balance of power. Germany’s 
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invasion of Belgium in 1914 worried him not because of its illegality but because 
Germany might come knocking on North America’s door next.191  
Roosevelt might therefore consider the United States’ chief national interest to be 
its control over its sphere of influence and the management of other powers’ control over 
theirs. In his era, the United States’ sphere of influence began to expand beyond the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans that insulated it from foreign powers. Today, Roosevelt 
might consider the entire world to be a sphere of U.S. influence worth protecting. 
Roosevelt’s balance of power calculus revolved around military might, which 
subsequent realist theory retained as a fundamental state asset. John Mearsheimer’s 
formulation of offensive realism theorizes what Roosevelt knew from instinct. 
Mearsheimer posits that states will use their power to ensure their survival in an anarchic 
world. In Mearsheimer’s calculus, as with Roosevelt’s, a state’s military power is the 
only true guarantor of survival. Mearsheimer argues that in order to guarantee its 
survival, a great power will insatiably pursue regional hegemony and attempt to deny 
regional hegemony to others.192 Further, he included two key contributors to military 
strength. First, he describes economic strength as a critical basis of military power.  
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Mearsheimer uses the term “latent power” to 
describe the resources a state can mobilize to build military strength. He describes the 
two pillars of latent power: population, from which a state recruits an army, and wealth, 
which a state uses to train, equip, and deploy that army.193 Second, Mearsheimer argues 
that a state may employ diplomatic strategies like balancing and buck-passing to augment 
its own military capacity.194  
Thus, from an offensive realist perspective rooted in Roosevelt’s political 
tradition, the United States has among its most important national interests these three 
ends: to maintain regional hegemony, to deny regional hegemony to others, and to 
maximize the United States’ economic and diplomatic power relative to its competitors. 
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2. Formulation of U.S. National Interest: Liberalism 
President Woodrow Wilson believed that democracy, peace, and American values 
to be ends in themselves and that the United States should be the righteous champion of 
those ends. He celebrated U.S. leadership in his first annual address in 1913, saying, 
More and more readily each decade do the nations manifest their 
willingness to bind themselves by solemn treaty to the processes of peace, 
the processes of frankness and fair concession. So far the United States 
has stood at the front of such negotiations.195 
The means Wilson advocated to pursue those ends included peaceful avenues 
like international arbitration as well as force against aggressors. He valued liberalism but 
was by no means a pacifist, saying that “we insist upon security in prosecuting our 
self-chosen lines of national development… We demand it also for others.”196 He argued 
that the United States had a fundamental national interest in the defense of liberal 
values everywhere. Defending that interest led the United States into World War I and 
guided Wilson’s pathway out of it: His Fourteen Points relied significantly on 
engendering international goodwill, establishing international organizations, and 
defending free trade.197 
Wilson entrenched liberalism as a national interest, and subsequent theorists made 
liberalism rigorous. In Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations, Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal provide statistical 
evidence that supports what Wilson held on faith. They provide evidence that 
democracies rarely fight one another, and that economic interdependence and 
international organizations can have powerful mediating effects that reduce the likelihood 
of interstate conflict.198  
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Wilson postulated that the United States has a duty to pursue global peace. 
Russett and Oneal argue that economic and diplomatic engagement can make peace more 
likely. A liberal perspective that incorporates both Wilson’s liberal faith and Russett and 
Oneal’s evidence suggests a national interest that competes with the realist’s conclusion: 
The United States should have an interest in supporting economic and diplomatic 
engagement, peace, and liberal values everywhere, whether the United States benefits 
directly or not.  
3. U.S. National Interest and China’s Economic Engagement 
This thesis does not arbitrate between competing realist and liberal systems. Both 
philosophies remain relevant because current theory and actual U.S. policy have shades 
of each, and neither entirely captures the United States’ complex motives. In a paper 
describing group decision-making dynamics, Jean Garrison discusses how different 
starting principles lead to different formulations of national interest: Realist, 
constructivist, and decision-making approaches yield different national interest priorities 
and different policy outcomes.199 Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill, lead authors for 
a report from the Commission on America’s National Interests, describe modern 
discussion of national interest as “dissensus”: Neither foreign policy scholars nor the 
public at large agree on what U.S. national interests are.200 Allison and Blackwill suggest 
that placing interests in a hierarchy is a useful way to create a single set of policies while 
using multiple philosophical starting points.201 Because different perspectives lead to 
different conclusions, this section considers the threat to U.S. national interests posed by 
China’s economic engagement with Cambodia and Kenya through the two lenses of 
realism and liberalism. Each lens yields a different estimation of the problem. 
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a. Realist Lens 
Realist formulation of national interest leads a policy maker to defend at least 
three interests: to maintain the United States’ regional hegemony, to curb China’s 
hegemonic aspirations, and to limit the growth of China’s wealth and diplomatic reach 
relative to the United States’. The cases of Cambodia and Kenya do not present a test of 
the first interest, since neither lies within the Western Hemisphere, the United States’ 
home region,202 but they do stand as test cases for the second and third interests. 
Through a realist lens, China’s economic engagement in Cambodia transparently 
suggests an effort to establish regional hegemony. The People’s Republic has a long 
history of influencing Cambodia’s behavior. Cambodia was one of China’s first non-
communist bloc diplomatic partners and subscribers to Beijing’s One China Policy, 
which wrested international clout from Taiwan, China’s ostensibly wayward territory. 
Cambodia was a major battlefield during China’s resistance to Soviet encirclement and 
Vietnamese expansion during the Cold War, an overt defense of its regional security 
interest. When China needed a friend in ASEAN to support China’s grand sovereignty 
claims in the South China Sea (or to suppress opposition to those claims, at least), 
Cambodia heeded the call. When Chinese hydropower projects on the Upper Mekong 
threatened the health of its downstream neighbors, Cambodian objections to river 
development evaporated. Beijing employs an array of tools to support its interests, but in 
all of these instances, the economic statecraft of foreign aid and investment appear to be a 
central element of Chinese strategy. Economic engagement is a tool for China’s realist 
expansion of regional power in Southeast Asia, which impinges on the United States’ 
interest in preventing China’s regional hegemony.  
China may have great power goals in Kenya, but its ambition there is more subtle. 
In the Cold War, Kenya was an arena of Sino-Soviet competition, nascent communist 
revolution, and One China Policy persuasion. As it did in Cambodia, China used aid to 
further those interests (although China largely failed). Unlike in Cambodia, China’s 
behavior changed substantially in the 1980s. Since the thawing of Sino-Kenyan relations 
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in the 1980s, China’s engagement in Kenya has been economic rather than ideological or 
geopolitical. Aside from the ubiquitous One China requirement, Beijing does not appear 
ask Nairobi for quid pro quo political favors. Instead, China looks to Kenya as a trading 
partner and investment venue. One reason China cultivates this relationship is for realist 
economic self-interest. When Beijing develops trading partners and expands its foreign 
investment portfolio, it gathers wealth, increases its latent power, and supports its 
capacity to use military force to pursue other interests. Further, Chinese aid programs 
build China’s soft power and rapport with Kenya, even if China does not yet wield its 
influence for specific political effects. Though modest and peaceful in itself, China’s 
economic and diplomatic engagement in Kenya is an element of China’s growing stature 
as a great power and, from a realist perspective, presents a strategic challenge to U.S. 
interests abroad. 
b. Liberal Lens 
Using a liberal lens to interpret China’s economic statecraft in Cambodia and 
Kenya yields very different conclusions. In Cambodia, China’s engagement is complex 
and its outcomes are ambiguous vis-à-vis liberal U.S. interests in peace and stability. 
In their empirical analysis of conditions leading to peace or war, Russett and Oneal 
include the effects of states’ power aspirations, levels of democracy, and economic 
interdependence. They find that a rising power preoccupied with security concerns 
contributes to regional instability and increases the likelihood of regional conflict.203 This 
finding agrees with the offensive realist’s wariness of an aspiring hegemon like China. 
The suppression of democracy also increases the likelihood of two states fighting.204 
Democracy suppression is a charge frequently leveled at China. Papers by Moisés Naím 
and by Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner argue that, in general, the aid Beijing offers 
without political condition makes it an attractive source of revenue for despots, eroding 
the reform efforts that underpin Western aid packages.205 Sophal Ear argues that this is 
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particularly the case in Cambodia, where Chinese aid supports Hun Sen’s illiberal 
government and discourages human rights reforms.206  
Chinese aid to Cambodia contributes to a bleak situation for liberal values, but a 
positive aspect may exist: China’s economic engagement has its benefits. In addition to 
democracy and institutional ties, Russett and Oneal credit economic engagement as 
contributing significantly to peace. China’s development of Mekong River development, 
despite its ecological hazards, has a genuine developmental motive. Wider access to 
electricity leads to wider prosperity, which in turn contributes to more trade, economic 
exchange, and peace. Further, although Chinese trade deals have been instrumental tools 
to increase Beijing’s influence in ASEAN,207 those deals nonetheless deepened China’s 
economic interdependence with Cambodia. “The benefits of trade may not be 
symmetrical and may favor the side with the stronger economic power in the market,” 
Russett and Oneal argue, “but trade is always to some degree a mutually beneficial 
interaction.”208 Thus, from a liberal perspective, Cambodia is an ambiguous case: A U.S. 
policy-maker might be alarmed at Chinese aid’s suppression of democracy, reform, and 
human rights, but may find at least some relief in the stability conferred by increased 
Sino-Cambodian economic interdependence. 
China’s aid to Kenya is a clearer case of beneficial economic interdependence. As 
discussed in Chapter III, there is little evidence in Kenya of China hoarding foreign 
natural resources, exporting overwhelming labor forces, or interfering with political 
reforms or outcomes. With the notable exception of diplomatic recognition and support 
of the One China Policy, Beijing does not extract political favors from Nairobi. Instead, 
China’s activity in Kenya revolves around trade, developmental investment, and project-
based aid. China recognizes that some elements of its economic engagement may have 
problems, like its persistent trade imbalance, and has published its acknowledgement and 
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corrective efforts.209 China’s acknowledgement of trade issues supports Thomas 
Christensen’s argument that China is learning how to conduct international engagement 
as it matures and grows wealthier. Rather than posing a challenge to the United States, 
China instead presents an opportunity for Washington to incorporate Beijing into the 
international economic community. Christensen argues that China’s relative inexperience 
in foreign aid offers the West an opportunity for international cooperation. He also argues 
that Chinese investment bodies like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have the 
potential to mitigate China’s internal corruption and to operate alongside Western 
organizations like the World Bank and the IMF.210 China’s engagement in Kenya appears 
to be an example of the Chinese economic statecraft in which Christensen sees the 
potential for genuine international benefit. 
In sum, interpreting China’s activity in Cambodia and Kenya through the lenses 
of realism and liberalism yields two different impressions. On one hand, the realist would 
interpret China’s manipulation of Cambodia and enrichment in Kenya as part of China’s 
attempt to gather latent power, support military development, and achieve regional Asian 
hegemony, which would directly challenge U.S. national security. On the other hand, the 
liberal would interpret China’s support of Cambodia’s autocracy, abuse of human rights, 
and disregard for water security as a challenge to U.S. liberal interests, but would have 
hope that at least Chinese engagement would support regional peace. In Kenya, the 
liberal would see development in Africa, improvement of poverty in China, and 
opportunity for Sino-American diplomatic engagement as China’s economic statecraft 
matures. 
This thesis does not argue that evidence supports liberalism over realism or vice 
versa. Rather, these two schools of thought are presented as complementary ways to 
evaluate this thesis’s hypotheses. Further, these formulations are not exhaustive. Other 
realist and liberal approaches may lead to slightly different formulations, and other 
schools of thought not mentioned—constructivism, individual psychology, and so on—
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may yield radically different conclusions. In this chapter, the two derivations of realist 
and liberal interests serve as two rubrics by which an analyst might gauge Chinese aid’s 
threat to the United States. 
B. HYPOTHESIS VALIDATION 
The evidence presented in Chapter II, Chapter III, and the first section of this 
chapter is sufficient to evaluate this thesis’s hypotheses. The cases of Chinese aid to 
Cambodia and Kenya validate the hypotheses that China buys international influence 
with its economic statecraft and that Chinese engagement presents a challenge to U.S. 
national interests. Evidence in these two cases does not, however, validate the hypothesis 
that the type of economic engagement by itself reveals China’s strategic intent. 
1. China Buys Influence with Foreign Aid and Investment 
Evidence validates the hypothesis that China employs foreign aid and investment 
to influence recipient states’ political behavior to serve China’s interests. In Cambodia, 
this thesis uses four cases to support this argument. In 1956, Cambodia became the first 
of many states to receive Chinese aid in exchange for diplomatic ties with Beijing and 
isolation of Taipei. In the 1960s and 1970s, China employed foreign aid to defend itself 
against Soviet and Vietnamese geopolitical threats with some $1.4 billion in grants, 
loans, and military aid to Cambodia, while also suspending its aid to Vietnam. China 
contributed around $10 billion to Cambodia between 1997 and 2012, which encouraged 
Phnom Penh to support Beijing’s South China Sea claims while Cambodia sat as 
ASEAN’s chair. Finally, Chinese aid in the past decade has softened Cambodian 
resistance to China’s development of hydropower on the Mekong River. Thus, there 
exists a case in which China buys influence with aid and investment. 
This hypothesis does not stipulate that all Chinese economic engagement supports 
narrow national interests in all cases, however. In the 1960s, China’s activity in Kenya 
was similar to its activity in Cambodia: Foreign aid fostered kinship between nonaligned 
states and supported nationalist revolutionary movements, both of which were 
fundamental Chinese interests at the time. Since the resumption of Sino-Kenyan relations 
in the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese aid and investment in Kenya has resulted in apparently 
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little direct benefit to narrow Chinese national interests (except for continued support for 
the One China Policy). Nevertheless, Kenya is not a counterexample that invalidates the 
hypothesis. Instead, Kenya is an example of how Chinese aid and investment can have 
value beyond merely purchasing a client’s fealty. There exists a case in Cambodia in 
which Chinese aid directly buys political influence, but there also exists a case in Kenya 
in which aid and investment appear to be genuinely developmental. Delivery of Chinese 
aid is not a sufficient condition to determine an intent to manipulate a client state. 
2. China’s Expansion of Influence Conflicts with U.S. Interests 
Evidence also validates the hypothesis that Chinese economic statecraft 
challenges U.S. national interests. Which interests China challenges depends on the 
analyst’s perspective: From a realist standpoint, Chinese aid to Cambodia and Kenya 
increase China’s economic, diplomatic, and military might, which increases China’s 
capability as a global power to challenge the United States. From a liberal standpoint, 
China’s aid has widespread deleterious consequences like suppression of democratic 
norms, erosion of Western reform efforts, human rights abuses, and ecological harm. 
These effects do not appear in both cases: China’s economic statecraft appears to cause 
more harm to liberal institutions in Cambodia, where aid pursues primarily political ends, 
than in Kenya, where aid and investment have a predominantly developmental aspect.  
These illiberal effects also may not be deliberate. This hypothesis does not require 
that China deliberately undermine U.S. interests; it requires only that Chinese and U.S. 
interests conflict. It is possible that China’s grand strategy involves preventing the spread 
of democracy and liberal values. It is also possible that, as an unintended consequence of 
the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China’s respect for recipients’ sovereignty 
makes its unconditional aid particularly attractive to illiberal regimes. Although those 
possibilities would each call for different U.S. responses, proving China’s intent to 
undermine the United States is beyond the scope of this thesis. In any case, China’s 
economic statecraft presents a problem for the United States. 
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3. Choice of Financial Mechanism Reveals China’s Intent 
Evidence does not support the hypothesis that the type of financial mechanism 
Beijing employs in the modern era correlates with the political effect of aid or the 
political purpose behind its employment. If the evidence could validate this hypothesis, 
then knowing the type of instrument—investment, grant, loan, or subsidy—would allow 
U.S. strategists to focus their analysis on aid flows that obviously have political motives 
and ignore those that do not. Differentiating political from developmental aid, however, 
is not possible based on the type of financing alone.  
During the Cold War, this analysis would have been trivially easy: Aid to 
Cambodia and Kenya alike was homogenous in both form and function. In form, China 
generally preferred grants, because Mao believed grants had a friendlier, more 
authentically communist public relations appearance than even interest-free loans.211 
China’s monetary aid to Cambodia in the 1950s through the 1970s were almost entirely 
grants, as was its brief series of flows to Kenya in 1964 and 1974. In function, the explicit 
purpose of China’s foreign aid program was to encourage solidarity in the non-aligned 
movement and provide support to revolutions. An analyst in the Cold War would not 
have needed to distinguish developmental from political foreign aid. 
In the modern era, however, China’s objectives for foreign aid and the vehicles it 
employs are more diverse. The type of vehicle and the apparent purpose behind its use no 
longer correlate well: China uses a wide variety of trade deals, investment activities, and 
aid flows to accomplish both developmental and political goals. In Cambodia, Chinese 
aid and investment may simultaneously accomplish both developmental and political 
goals, as with the grants, loans, and trade agreements established in 2012 that coincided 
with, and probably contributed to, Cambodia’s advocacy for Chinese maritime claims. 
Chinese activity in Kenya also comes in grant, loan, investment, and trade forms, but has 
little apparent political motive. The conclusion from this analysis is that the purpose 
behind Chinese economic statecraft is not evident a priori from the type of engagement 
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alone; rather, the purpose of China’s engagement is only evident a posteriori when its 
political or economic effects become apparent. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Research conducted in support of this thesis uncovers several avenues for further 
research: Expansion of this thesis’s analysis into more recipient states in more regions, 
characterization of China as a regional or a global power, a supply and demand model of 
illiberal foreign aid, inconsistent correlation of Chinese aid and recipient natural capital, 
and Kenya’s inclusion in OBOR. 
1. Broader Scope 
With an n of 2, this thesis has an exceedingly small sample size. A small-sample 
study presents the opportunity to validate existential hypotheses: That there exists at least 
one case in which evidence validates a hypothesis. In this study, evidence in Cambodia 
shows that China, in at least that case, buys diplomatic influence. Conversely, evidence in 
Kenya shows that China, in at least that case, pursues apparently developmental ends. 
The limitation of such a small sample is that the evidence presented makes no suggestion 
about which paradigm is more common than which. Further research across more cases is 
needed to determine which case is the rule and which is the exception: Is China a 
manipulator with developmental side projects, or is it a developer that occasionally 
meddles in political influence? 
Increasing the sample size may involve additional cases in Southeast Asia and 
Africa. A larger sample may also involve casting a wider geographic net to determine 
whether, for example, China conducts economic engagement similarly in Africa and 
Latin America, or in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. Further, additional research is 
warranted in Europe. China does not have much history of either asserting its will or 
encouraging development in Europe, but China’s recent overtures to Greece (and 
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Greece’s subsequent political concessions to China) may be prelude to increasing 
Chinese involvement in the First World.212 
2. Characterizing China as a Regional or Global Power 
A larger sample size would also lead to a new research question: Is China a 
regional or a global power? The comparison in this thesis of China’s extensive 
involvement in Cambodia’s affairs, but relatively arms-length engagement in Kenya’s, 
suggests China’s power may be limited to its own region.  
Evidence presented in Chapter II supports characterizing China as a regional 
power. Definitions of regional power status differ: John Ikenberry et al. and Luis 
Schenoni argue that a state becomes a regional power by controlling a preponderance of a 
region’s material wealth and by having the capacity to use it.213 David Shambaugh 
considers China’s “growing economic and military power, expanding political influence, 
distinctive diplomatic voice, and increasing involvement in regional multilateral 
institutions” as elements of China’s regional power, but he also warns of the folly of 
analyzing China’s rise through any single realist or liberal rubric.214 China is likely to 
meet any scholarly definition of an important regional actor in East Asia (alongside other 
significant regional actors like South Korea or Japan), even if it falls short of unipole or 
regional hegemon status. Cambodia’s case supports this characterization. Evidence in 
Chapter II shows that the People’s Republic has exerted over six decades of continuous 
effort to win Cambodia’s support, influence Cambodia’s politics, and employ Cambodia 
as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy. China’s engagement in Cambodia serves 
China’s regional strategic goals, including maintenance of stable borders and domestic 
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development. Further research is required to determine whether China conducts itself 
similarly with other Southeast Asian neighbors.  
Evidence introduced in Chapter III does not support characterizing China as a 
global power. Two defining features of a global power are having interests worldwide 
and wielding the capacity, whether diplomatic, economic, or military, to defend them. 
The United States, by any measure a global power, is committed to the mutual defense of 
treaty allies in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, to unimpeded trade on the high seas, and 
to maintenance of the global economic order, among other global concerns. In the 
defense of those interests, the United States maintains diplomatic ties and a credible 
military presence nearly everywhere on Earth.215 For the time being, China appears to 
have neither the global interests nor the reach that would make it a global power. 
Evidence in Kenya supports this conclusion: Although Chinese economic engagement 
has expanded to include Kenya, China’s diplomatic pressure there is scarce and its 
military capability is absent.  
In short, China’s diversity of activity in Cambodia, and its comparatively one-
dimensional engagement in Kenya, paint a picture of China as a primarily regional actor. 
A broader array of data points may support this hypothesis. 
3. China’s Intent and the Supply and Demand of Foreign Aid 
This thesis does not attempt to determine whether China deliberately challenges 
the Western economic order or merely acts independently of it. The literature review in 
Chapter I discusses criticism of Chinese aid as a challenge to Western economic 
influence. In particular, Barma and Ratner characterize China as direct challenger to 
Western economic influence. Is it possible that instead of overthrowing Western 
interstate financial systems, China merely offers a better foreign aid product? 
Traditional, private loan markets can be modeled as products with supply-demand 
curves, as in Figure 5. The quantity axis is the amount of money available to the loan 
market, while the price axis is the interest rate charged by lenders. The supply curve is 
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positive when savers incur an opportunity cost when lending saved money. The demand 
curve is negative because lower interest rates increase the amount of money a recipient 
could usefully borrow. The intersection of these two curves gives the equilibrium 
quantity of money available for loans and the equilibrium interest rate charged by 
lenders.216  
 
 Typical Loan Supply-Demand Curves Figure 5. 
Foreign aid can be modeled by the same curves with an added analogy (as in 
Figure 6): Instead of the price axis representing interest rates, it represents the sum of 
interest rate plus the conditionality of a loan. For a given interest rate, loans with 
exceptionally onerous conditions (like abdication of power, for example) result in zero 
demand; conversely, loans with few conditions are more attractive to recipient states 
wishing to maintain their sovereignty. As with traditional loans, interest rate remains a 
factor in the price of aid: High interest rates are a burden for the recipient, while low (or 
zero) rates ease repayment. Essentially, the price of a loan is a function of both the 
financial cost and the regime’s surrendering of autonomy. The sum price is interest rate 
plus conditions, or IR+C. 
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 Foreign Aid Supply-Demand Curves Figure 6. 
Two qualities of Chinese foreign aid help its re-interpretation in a supply/demand 
model. First, Chinese aid is generally unconditional with respect to liberal standards of 
governance. China attaches no demands for autocrats to relax or for kleptocrats to 
straighten up.217 In supply and demand terms, an artificially low price expressed in IR+C 
would create a shortage of foreign aid among the shady regimes who want for it. Second, 
Chinese aid is new and is expanding rapidly. Its volume has increased significantly since 
its rejuvenation around the turn of the twenty-first century.  
The result of these two qualities (decreased IR+C and increased supply) result in 
the supply-demand curves in Figure 7. Western aid, such as that from the United States or 
from the IMF, carries a certain interest rate and a certain list of conditions. The donor 
organizations have a supply curve of aid they are prepared to deliver, S1, and the 
recipient states have a demand curve of aid they seek, D. Assuming a fair international 
aid environment, the intersection of S1 and D results in IR1+C1, which is the 
combination of interest rates and liberal conditions that the international community 
believes is reasonable.  
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 Shifts in Foreign Aid Costs Figure 7. 
Beginning in 2001, China began its modern unconditional foreign aid campaign. 
This rapid increase in pledged foreign aid shifts the supply curve rightward to S2, which 
shifts the equilibrium cost of aid receipt downward to IR2+C2. Western aid, whose price 
remains IR1+C1, is suddenly less attractive to the autocracies that yearn for less 
burdensome capital. In other words, China’s foreign aid is undercutting the West with a 
better product at a cheaper price. 
One policy consequence of this model is that if the West intends to use foreign aid 
conditionality as a diplomatic tool, it must compete on interest rates. This is possible with 
the choice of foreign aid vehicle. For a given recipient state, if China extends a loan with 
interest rate IRChina and few conditions, the West’s best competitive hope for influence is 
to extend a competing loan such that IRWest << IRChina, resulting in a favorable final price 
tag (that is, IRWest+CWest < IRChina+CChina). In other words, the Western lender must offer 
autocrats exceedingly low financial prices to overcome the burden of conditionality. If 
China offers concessional loans, the West must offer zero-interest loans. If China offers a 
0 percent interest rate, then the West must offer grants. If China offers grants, then the 
West is simply out of luck and should pursue other avenues of diplomatic pressure. 
Even if this model holds explanatory power, it is unlikely by itself to explain a 
state’s decisions when accepting foreign assistance. In addition to the narrow financial 
and political cost of a loan, a recipient state may consider a host of other factors. The 
recipient may have broader political goals and thus accept onerous conditions in order to 
foster important bilateral ties. The recipient may also consider concessions of autonomy 
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to be a desired element of an aid package, rather than a cost: A ruler who wants reform 
but lacks the expertise to effect it might welcome intrusive IMF or World Bank 
requirements. The costs and benefits of a loan may be eclipsed by other unrelated factors. 
The degree to which conditionality contributes to the cost of a loan is uncertain. It 
is also uncertain how heavily states weigh cost-benefit calculus relative to other political 
or strategic considerations. Further research is required to determine the explanatory 
power of this model as a U.S. policy tool and an alternative to characterizing China as a 
deliberate challenger to the West’s liberal economic order. 
4. Do Chinese Aid and FDI Chase Natural Resources? 
Deborah Brautigam argues that while China is interested in secure sources of 
natural resources to support its development, China disburses aid evenly across African 
recipients, regardless of their natural resource wealth. She goes on to argue that 
“resources matter, but China’s ‘mutual benefit’ approach is about generating 
business,”218 and that characterizations of China as an insatiable resource glutton are 
unfounded.219 Brautigam makes this argument specifically with respect to China’s ODA-
like grant and concessionary loan distribution across Sub-Saharan Africa. Because of the 
opacity veiling China’s aid, this thesis is unable to substantiate or refute Brautigam’s 
specific claim without broader research. FDI data, however, is more readily available. 
Does Chinese FDI pursue natural resources? Does it behave similarly in Africa and in 
Southeast Asia? 
In Africa, Chinese FDI correlates positively with host countries’ natural resource 
endowments, whereas in Southeast Asia, it does not. Two data sets support this 
observation: First, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which aggregates FDI 
flows and stocks for 206 countries, including China.220 Second, the Inclusive Wealth 
Report published by the UN University International Human Dimensions Programme and 
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UN Environment Programme, which quantifies the natural capital endowments of 140 
countries.221 Correlating these two data sets yields different results in each region. In 
Africa, Chinese FDI stocks and hosts’ natural capital correlate as being directly 
proportional (r = 0.72). African countries with larger natural resource endowments 
commonly draw more Chinese investment (see Figure 8). Among ASEAN members, 
however, FDI and natural capital are approximately inversely proportional (correlated 
weakly at r = -0.34), which suggests Chinese investment there is natural resource-
agnostic (see Figure 9). Adding a third data set, recipient countries’ GDP, paints the same 
picture. African GDP correlates (r = 0.87) with Chinese FDI, but ASEAN states’ GDP 
does not correlate with Chinese FDI at all (r = -0.03).222 Data are summarized in Figures 
10 and 11. 
 
 Chinese FDI Stock vs. Natural Resource Capital in Africa Figure 8. 
                                                 
221 Inclusive Wealth Report 2014 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2014), 244–251. 




 Chinese FDI Stock vs. Natural Resource Capital in ASEAN Figure 9. 
 
 Chinese FDI vs. GDP in ASEAN Figure 10. 
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  Chinese FDI Stock vs. GDP in Africa Figure 11. 
These data suggest that China invests its capital differently in different regions. In 
Africa, host country wealth and natural resources appear to attract Chinese investment, 
which is an unsurprising result. In Southeast Asia, Chinese investment appears to be 
motivated by factors other than hosts’ economic strength or exploitable resources. Data 
presented are insufficient to draw clear causal relationships, but they align with the broad 
findings of the case studies presented here. These results raise several questions: Does 
China preferentially pursue sources of natural resources in Africa? If economic and 
resource wealth do not drive Chinese FDI in Southeast Asia, what does? Does China 
have political, rather than economic, motives for its economic statecraft in its own 
region? Finally, would this analysis yield the same conclusions if applied to Chinese 
foreign aid (that is, grants and concessional loans) instead of FDI? 
5. Is Kenya a Part of OBOR? 
Further research in Kenya may uncover a serious challenge to this thesis’s 
conclusions. Chapter III explored China’s activity in Kenya, but conspicuously absent 
was analysis of China’s OBOR initiatives. Is China’s activity in Kenya preparation for 
OBOR’s implementation? If so, what might that activity mean for U.S. interests? 
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OBOR is an ambitious constellation of trade relationships and transportation 
infrastructure projects recently launched by President Xi Jinping. China’s goal will be 
eventually to connect Europe, Central Asia, China, Southeast Asia, India, Eastern Africa, 
and the Middle East in a series of interlocking ports, highways, railways, and pipelines. 
China stands to benefit handsomely by the increased volume of goods traded along 
OBOR, as do the 60 or so countries through which OBOR will pass. One of those 
countries may be Kenya, whose ports and Mombasa and Lamu, highways to Nairobi, and 
standard-gauge railways may yet become valuable components of China’s trading 
network. 
Peter Ferdinand notes that OBOR is likely to have geopolitical effects. OBOR 
may signal China’s willingness to compete with the United States in global economics 
and indicate a long-term effort to become a global, not just regional, power.223 Ferdinand 
also argues that this project is as risky as it is ambitious. Its success depends on 
participants’ enduring enthusiasm for China’s new system as well as the specific 
development of such a system. OBOR will require widespread acceptance of China’s 
vision of “how the global community might move, or be induced to move, towards the 
better global order that it both advocates and expects.”224 If participants attrite, OBOR 
could become a political tragedy for Xi and the CCP. China’s reliance on a shared vision 
may explain why cultural outreach, Chinese language training, and ostensibly selfless 
development projects may all be merely instruments in OBOR’s success. 
Other analysts point to constructivist elements of OBOR. Tim Winter notes that 
China draws historical comparisons between OBOR and the old Silk Road, dynastic 
China’s overland trade routes. Winter writes that “the Silk Road is a story of peaceful 
trade, and a rich history of religious and harmonious cultural exchange. The Belt and 
Road seeks to directly build on this legacy.”225 Li Mingjiang presents a different 
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224 Ibid., 956. 
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perspective, writing that OBOR is “a reflection of the emerging consensus in the Chinese 
foreign policy community that Beijing now needs to significantly shift from the ‘low-
profile’ international strategy to actively strive for more accomplishments.”226 In other 
words, Winter and Li argue that OBOR has constructed value: More than just a power 
play or a development strategy, OBOR represents the cultural stature that China once 
held and could soon regain. For the United States policy analyst, this constructivist 
interpretation may suggest that instead of blindly resisting China’s rise, the United States 
might be able to understand and engage with the cultural motivation behind China’s 
adventures. 
Further research into OBOR in Kenya and elsewhere is required. This thesis 
depends chiefly on the political outcomes of China’s economic effort, not merely its 
supposed intent. Because OBOR is so new, its effects on participant countries and on the 
United States have not yet become apparent. If Kenya becomes an active OBOR 
participant, one conclusion of this thesis—that Chinese activity in Kenya is chiefly 
developmental and scarcely political—may require reexamination. In Kenya, the degree 
to which China invests for development’s sake, and the degree to which China invests in 
infrastructure and goodwill to support its narrower OBOR interest, remain to be seen. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has explored China’s economic statecraft of foreign aid, investment, 
and trade activity. It has asked three questions: What has China gained from its 
generosity? What does China’s choice of financial vehicle say about the intent behind its 
delivery? And should the United States be concerned about China’s economic 
engagement? In answering these questions, this thesis has outlined sixty years of Sino-
Cambodian and Sino-Kenyan political history. This thesis concludes that in Cambodia’s 
case, China has derived a great deal of direct political benefit from its aid and investment 
there but substantially less obvious benefit from engaging Kenya.  
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The different tenors of Sino-Cambodian and Sino-Kenyan relations indicate 
China has the capacity to form completely different economic and political policies for 
different foreign partners. This capacity should be no surprise, since a state applying one-
size-fits-all foreign policy would show grotesque mismanagement indeed. Comparing the 
cases of China-as-manipulator in Cambodia and China-as-partner in Kenya results is a 
cautionary tale for analysts. Assigning China as uniformly having one or the other role in 
the world will inevitably lead the analyst to miss the bigger picture: Sometimes China 
acts as a geopolitical threat, and sometimes it acts as an emerging power worth engaging, 
and determining which role China assumes should be part and parcel of creating U.S. 
foreign policies in response. 
  
 82
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 83
LIST OF REFERENCES 
“About MCC.” Millennium Challenge Corporation. Accessed 24 August 2016. 
https://www.mcc.gov/about.  
“Addis Ababa Action Plan (2004–2006).” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 16 
December 2003. http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/focac/185197.htm.  
“Agreement between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade 
and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India.” Treaty Series vol. 
299. United Nations. 3 June 1954. 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf.  
Allison, Graham T., and Robert Blackwill. America’s National Interests. Cambridge, 
MA: The Commission on America’s National Interests, 2000. 
Armstrong, J. D. Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United 
Front Doctrine. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1977. 
Bajpaee, Chietigj. “Asia’s Coming Water Wars.” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 
4, issue 8, no. 0 (August 2006):  
http://apjjf.org/-Chietigj-Bajpaee/2207/article.html. 
Barma, Naazneen, and Eli Ratner. “China’s Illiberal Challenge: The Real Threat Posed 
by China Isn’t Economic or Military—It’s Ideological.” Democracy Journal (Fall 
2006): 56–68. 
Bartke, Wolfgang. China’s Economic Aid. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. 
“Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.” Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation. 12 October 2000. 
http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/hywj/t157833.htm.  
“Bilateral FDI Statistics.” UN Conference on Trade and Development. United Nations. 
2014. http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-
Bilateral.aspx. 
Brautigam, Deborah. “Chinese Development Aid in Africa: What, Where, Why, and How 
Much?” In Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Jane 
Golley and Ligang Song, 203–22. Canberra: Australian National University, 
2011. 
———. The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford 
University, 2009.  
 84
Brown, David E. Africa’s Booming Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Production: 
National Security Implications for the United States and China. Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2013. 
Burgos, Sigfrido, and Sophal Ear. “China’s Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence 
and Resources.” Asian Survey 50, no. 3 (2010): 615–639. 
doi:10.1525/as.2010.50.3.615. 
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. “Aid, Policies, and Growth.” The American Economic 
Review 90, no. 4 (September 2000): 847–868. doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.847.  
Chanboreth, Ek, and Sok Hach. “Aid Effectiveness in Cambodia.” Wolfensohn Center 
for Development Working Paper 7, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 
December 2008. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/12_cambodia_aid_chanboreth.pdf.  
Chege, Michael. “Economic Relations Between Kenya and China, 1963–2007.” In U.S. 
and Chinese Engagement in Africa, edited by Jennifer Cooke, 12–32. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2008. 
Chen Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 
2001. 
“China’s Foreign Trade.” Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of 
China. December 2011. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper 
/2014/08/23/content_281474983043184.htm.  
“China’s Peaceful Development.” Information Office of the State Council. People’s 
Republic of China. September 2011. http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-
09/06/content_1941354.htm.  
“Chinese Checkers: Asian Maritime Diplomacy.” The Economist, 21 July 2012. Proquest 
(1027555047). 
Chowdhury, Khorshed. “What’s Happening to Per Capita GDP in the ASEAN Countries? 
An Analysis of Convergence, 1960–2001.” Applied Econometrics and 
International Development 5, no. 3 (2005): 49–68. 
http://www.usc.es/economet/reviews/aeid533.pdf. 
Christensen, Thomas J. Lecture. Naval Postgraduate School. 4 Aug 2016. 
———. The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power. New York: W. 
W. Norton, 2015. 
Chu Hao. “Enduring Ties.” Beijing Review 53, no. 2 (2 January 2014). 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/print/txt/2010-01/09/content_239110.htm.  
 85
Ciorciari, John D. “China and Cambodia: Patron and Client?” IPC Working Paper Series 
Number 121, International Policy Center, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 14 June 2013. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/22c1/5ad7e67139f1be207a9b8386f63c46e6cce7.
pdf.   
Copper, John F. China’s Foreign Aid. Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1976. 
———. China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. II: History and Practice in 
Asia, 1950–Present. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016. 
———. China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy, Vol. III: Strategy Beyond Asia 
and Challenges to the United States and the International Order. London: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2016. 
Country Profile: Kenya. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division. Library of 
Congress. June 2007. https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/Kenya.pdf. 
“Development Finance Data.” Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Accessed 24 August 2016. http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-
development/development-finance-data/. 
Downs, Erica S. “The Chinese Energy Security Debate.” The China Quarterly, no. 177 
(March 2004): 21–41. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20192303.  
Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. “Are ‘New’ Donors Different? 
Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid between non-DAC and DAC Donor 
Countries.” World Development 39, no. 11 (November 2011): 1950–1968. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.024.   
Ear, Sophal. Aid Dependence in Cambodia: How Foreign Assistance Undermines 
Democracy. New York: Columbia University, 2013. 
———. “The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia.” Asian Journal of 
Political Science 15, no. 1 (2007): 68–96. doi:/10.1080/02185370701315624.  
“Economy Rankings.” The World Bank. 2017. http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
Ferdinand, Peter. “Westward Ho–The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese 
Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping.” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (July 2016): 
941–957. doi:/10.1111/1468-2346.12660.  
Foster, Vivien, William Butterfield, Chuan Chen, and Nataliya Pushak. Building Bridges: 
China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2009.  
 86
Fravel, M. Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 33, no. 3 (2011): 292–319. https://taylorfravel.com/documents/research 
/fravel.2011.CSA.china.strategy.scs.pdf.   
Ganjanakhundee, Supalak. “Will Hun Sen’s Visit Unblock Mekong Dam Diplomacy?” 
The Nation, 11 Jan 2017. https://www.pressreader.com/thailand/the-
nation/20170111/281745564074146.  
Gapminder World. Accessed 9 September 2016. https://www.gapminder.org/world/.  
Garrison, Jean. “Constructing the ‘National Interest’ in U.S.–China Policy Making: How 
Foreign Policy Decision Groups Define and Signal Policy Choices.” Foreign 
Policy Analysis 3 (2007): 105–26. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2007.00043.x. 
“GDP by Country | Statistics from IMF, 1980–2021.” Knoema. Accessed 1 September 
2017. https://knoema.com/tbocwag/gdp-by-country-statistics-from-imf-1980-
2021. 
Glosny, Michael A. Meeting the Development Challenge in the 21st Century: American 
and Chinese Perspectives on Foreign Aid. (New York: National Committee on 
United States–China Relations, 2006). 
https://www.ncuscr.org/sites/default/files/page_attachments/Foreign-Aid.pdf.  
Hempson-Jones, Justin S. “The Evolution of China’s Engagement with International 
Governmental Organizations: Toward a Liberal Foreign Policy?” Asian Survey 
45, no. 5 (October 2005): 702–721. doi:10.1525/as.2005.45.5.702.  
Henze, Paul. The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 
1991. 
Hornby, Lucy, and Luc Cohen. “No Ties? No Problem as China Courts Taiwan’s 
Remaining Allies.” Reuters, 6 August 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-centralamerica-idUSBRE97514C20130806. 
Hornsby, Charles. Kenya: A History since Independence. London: I. B. Taurus & Co, 
2012. 
Horowitz, Jason, and Liz Alderman. “Chastised by E.U., a Resentful Greece Embraces 
China’s Cash and Interests.” The New York Times, 26 August 2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/europe/greece-china-piraeus-alexis-
tsipras.html.   
Hutchinson, Alan. China’s African Revolution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 
1975. 
 87
Ikenberry, G. John, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth. “Unipolarity, State 
Behavior, and Systemic Consequences.” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009): 
1–27. doi:10.1017/S004388710900001X. 
Inclusive Wealth Report 2014. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2014. 
Index Mundi. Accessed 9 September 2016. http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators. 
“Interactive summary charts for total DAC, DAC and non-DAC members.” Organization 
of Economic Cooperation and Development. Updated 20 December 2016. 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-
finance-data/aid-at-a-glance.htm.  
“Is It ODA?” Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. November 2008. 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf.  
Jackson, Steven F. “China’s Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and 
Mozambique, 1961–93.” The China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 388–422. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/655421.  
Jencks, Harlan W. “China’s ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment.” Asian 
Survey 19, no. 8 (August 1979): 801–15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643723. 
Jia Qingguo, and Alan D. Romberg. “Taiwan and Tibet.” In Debating China: The U.S.-
China Relationship in Ten Conversations, edited by Nina Hachigian, 176–197. 
Oxford: Oxford University, 2014. 
Kaplan, Stephen B. “Banking Unconditionally: The Political Economy of Chinese 
Finance in Latin America.” Review of International Political Economy (1 
September 2016). doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1216005. 
Kalicki, J. H. The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 
1950s. London: Cambridge University, 1975. 
Karl, Rebecca E. Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise 
History. Durham: Duke University, 2010. 
Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. 
Kurlantzick, Joshua. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the 
World. New Haven: Yale University, 2008. 
“The Loanable Funds Market: Graphical Explanation.” Muddy Water Macro. 
Washington University in St. Louis. Accessed 31 May 2016. 
https://muddywatermacro.wustl.edu/loanable-funds-graphical-explanation.  
 88
“Laos Halts Xayaburi Dam Work.” Asia Times, 11 May 2012. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NE11Ae02.html. 
Li Mingjiang. “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: New Round of Opening Up.” 
RSIS Commentaries. Nanyang Technological University. 11 March 2015. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/39874.  
Mahbubani, Kishore. “Is China Losing the Diplomatic Plot?” Project Syndicate. 26 July 
2012. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/is-china-losing-the-
diplomatic-plot. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated ed. New York: 
Norton, 2014. 
Meditz, Sandra W., and Tim Merrill, ed. Zaire: A Country Study. Washington, DC: 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 1994. 
https://www.loc.gov/item/94025092/.  
“Mekong Basin.” Mekong River Commission. Accessed 7 December 2016. 
http://www.mrcmekong.org/mekong-basin/.  
Miller, Thomas, and Cheang Sokha. “Hun Sen Denies China Dam Impacts.” The Phnom 
Penh Post, 17 November 2010. http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/hun-
sen-denies-china-dam-impacts.  
Millis, Walter, ed. American Military Thought. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966. 
Mohan, T. “Hun Sen Dismisses Reports on Don Sahong Dam Construction.” Khmer 
Times, 12 July 2015. http://www.khmertimeskh.com/news/13211/hun-sen-
dismisses-reports-on-don-sahong-dam-construction/. 
Molle, François, Tira Foran, and Mira Käkönen, ed. Contested Waterscapes in the 
Mekong Region: Hydropower, Livelihoods, and Governance. London: Earthscan, 
2009. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid.” The American Political 
Science Review 56, no. 2 (June 1962): 301–09. doi:10.2307/1952366. 
Naím, Moisés. “Rogue Aid.” Foreign Policy, no. 159 (2007): 95–96. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/224026979/abstract 
/A072B4CCD55C4582PQ/1.  




“Net official development assistance and official aid received (current US$).” World 
Bank. Accessed 3 May 2017. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?contextual=default&loca
tions=KH.  
“Oil, Politics and Corruption.” The Economist 388, 18 September 2008. 
http://www.economist.com/node/12080765.  
Onjala, Joseph. A Scoping Study on China-Africa Economic Relations: The Case of 





———. “China’s Comparative Trade, Aid and Investment Behavior in Kenya vis-à-vis 
India and the European Union (EU).” In Strengthening the Civil Society 
Perspective: China’s African Impact, edited by Stephen Marks, 69–87. Cape 
Town: Fahamu, 2009.  
———. “The Impact of China-Africa Trade Relations: The Case of Kenya,” AERC 
Collaborative Research China-Africa Project, no. 5 (November 2010): 1–4. 
Osborne, Milton. “Laos: Playing to Win in Mekong Hydropower Game.” The Interpreter, 
9 December 2016. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/laos-playing-win-
mekong-hydropower-game. 
———. The Mekong: River under Threat. New South Wales: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, 2009. 
“Other Official Flows (OOF).” Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 2016. https://data.oecd.org/drf/other-official-flows-oof.htm. 
Passell, Peter. “Economic Watch; Big Trade Deficit With Japan: Some Think It’s No 
Problem.” The New York Times, 15 February 1994. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/15/business/economic-watch-big-trade-deficit-
with-japan-some-think-it-s-no-problem.html.  
Perlez, Jane. “Asian Leaders at Regional Meeting Fail to Resolve Disputes over South 
China Sea.” New York Times, 13 July 2012, sec. A. 
“Programme for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development.” 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. 12 October 2000. 
http://www.focac.org/eng/wjjh/hywj/t157834.htm.  
“The Proliferation of Dams along the Mekong River.” The Economist, 16 February 2016. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/daily-chart-11 
 90
Richardson, Sophie. “Challenges for a ‘Responsible Power.’” Human Rights Watch. 
Accessed 24 August 2016. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/china/china.pdf. 
———. China, Cambodia and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. New York: 
Columbia, 2010. 
Rosen, Mark E. “Challenges to Public Order and the Seas.” CNA China Studies. March 
2014. https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DPP-2013-U-006302-1Rev.pdf.  
Ross, Russell, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress. 1987. 
https://www.loc.gov/item/89600150/?q=cambodia.  
Russett, Bruce, and John R. Oneal. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, 
and International Organizations. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001. 
Sanghi, Apurva, and Dylan Johnson. “Deal or No Deal: Strictly Business for China in 
Kenya?” Policy Research Working Paper 7614, The World Bank, March 2016. 
Sato, Jin, Hiroaki Shiga, Takaaki Kobayashi, and Hisahiro Kondoh. “‘Emerging Donors’ 
from a Recipient Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in 
Cambodia.” World Development 39, no. 12 (December 2011): 2091–2104. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.04.014. 
Scalopino, Robert A. “Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa.” Foreign Affairs 42, no. 4 
(July 1964): 640–52, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029719.  
“Scarborough Shoal Standoff: A Timeline.” Global Nation. Inquirer.net. 9 May 2012. 
https://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-
historicaltimeline. 
Schenoni, Luis Leandro. “Subsystemic Unipolarities? Power Distribution and State 
Behaviour in South America and Southern Africa.” Strategic Analysis 41, no. 1 
(2017): 74–86. doi:10.1080/09700161.2016.1249179. 
Shambaugh, David. “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order.” International 
Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 64–99. 
———. China Goes Global: The Partial Power. Oxford: Oxford University, 2013. 
Strangio, Sebastian. “China’s Aid Emboldens Cambodia.” Yale Global Online. Accessed 
16 May 2012. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinas-aid-emboldens-cambodia.  
“The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China.” Taiwan Affairs Office & 
Information Office. State Council, People’s Republic of China. August 1993. 
http://china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm. 
 91
Thayer, Carlyle A. “ASEAN’s Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test 
for Community-Building.” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus vol. 10, issue 
34, no. 4 (August 2012): 20–26. 
Tiezzi, Shannon. “Why Taiwan’s Allies are Flocking to Beijing.” The Diplomat,  
19 November 2013. http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/why-taiwans-allies-are-
flocking-to-beijing/.  
Tin, Zakariya “Cambodia Warns Laos Over Mekong Dam.” Radio Free Asia, 25 April 
2012. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/dam-04192012143244.html. 
“Tracking Chinese Development Finance.” AidData. Accessed 2 July 2017. 
http://aiddata.org/china.   
“UN Comtrade Database.” United Nations. Accessed 29 March 2017. 
https://comtrade.un.org/data/. 
Un, Kheang. “Cambodia in 2012: Beyond the Crossroads?” Asian Survey 53, no. 1 
(January/February 2013): 142–49. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2013.53.1.142.  
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 1982. 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.  
UN General Assembly. Resolution 2758. Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the 




“U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed 1 
September 2017. https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/. 
Var, Veasna. “Cambodia Should Be Cautious when It Comes to Chinese Aid.” East Asia 
Forum, 9 July 2016. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/09/cambodia-should-
be-cautious-when-it-comes-to-chinese-aid/print/.  
Vatikiotis, Michael. “A Too-Friendly Embrace,” Far Eastern Economic Review 167, no. 
24 (2004): 20–22. 
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1990.  
“Weekly Summary Special Report: Soviet Policy in Africa South of the Sahara.” Central 
Intelligence Agency. 28 February 1969. https://www.cia.gov/library 
/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A006900050003-1.pdf. 
 92
Wilson, Woodrow. “First Annual Message.” The American Presidency Project. 
University of California, Santa Barbara. 2 December 1913. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29554.  
———. “Fourteen Points.” The Avalon Project. Yale University. 8 January 1918. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. 
Winter, Tim. “One Belt, One Road, One Heritage: Cultural Diplomacy and the Silk 
Road.” The Diplomat, 29 March 2016. http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/one-belt-
one-road-one-heritage-cultural-diplomacy-and-the-silk-road/.  
Wolf, Charles Jr, Xiao Wang, and Eric Warner. China’s Foreign Aid and Government-
Sponsored Investment Activities: Scale, Content, Destinations, and Implications. 
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR118.html.  
Womack, Brantly. “Asymmetry and Systemic Misperception: China, Vietnam and 
Cambodia during the 1970s.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 2 (June 
2003): 92–119. 
Woods, Ngaire. “Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent 
Revolution in Development Assistance.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944–) 84, no. 6 (1 November 2008): 1205–1221. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00765.x. 
Worthing, Peter M. “Strange Bedfellows: China and Cambodia since 1949.” American 
Asian Review 18, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 53–76. Proquest (211389313). 
Wright, Joseph, and Matthew Winters. “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid.” Annual 
Review of Political Science 13, no. 1 (2010): 61–80. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.032708.143524.  
“WTO Report Addresses Trade Surplus.” Central People’s Government of the People’s 
Republic of China. 21 March 2006. http://www.gov.cn/english/chinatoday/2006-
03/21/content_232068.htm. 
Wu Xinbo, and Michael Green. “Regional Security Roles and Challenges.” In Debating 
China, edited by Nina Hachigian, 198–220. Oxford: Oxford University, 2014.  
Yu, George T. “Africa in Chinese Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey 28, no. 8 (August 1988): 
849–62, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644590.  
Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics 
and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University, 2014. 
  
 93
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
